Berlin after the Wall:
Two Major Mistakes

Paper presented at
CITOP-Conference
Brussels, 1999

Gerhard O. Braun
Gerhard O. Braun: Berlin after The Wall:
Band 40, 2000 Two Major Mistakes

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METAR - MANUSKRIPTE ZUR
EMPIRISCHEN, THEORETISCHEN UND ANGEWANDTEN REGIONALFORSCHUNG

ISSN:0170-6268

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Confusing statements

During the last 10 years changes in discourse regarding the future development of Berlin and its internal and external integration have been frequent. How realistic and serious the research that has given sustenance to these discourses?. Having collected these statements documented 1993 (see Fig. 1), I asked the question whether these statements were

- self-explanatory of the situation of change or were

- representing psychological barriers against any kind of change or forward-looking planning concepts or were

- expressing the hope for transcending the artificial economic and social environment that had been preserved until 1990, hampering the city’s ability to compete with the rest of the world.

At present, responses to questions posed regarding the Berlin region’s future development are still confusing - less because of approaching insecurity, but more because of the unanticipated and (hence) disappointing realities of economic restructuring and globalisation.

Certainly, future urban planning will become much more aggressive than it was in the early 1990s, when planning was guided by a philosophy of preserving the socio-spatial ecologies in the western part of Berlin and of growth orientation in the east. In times of major structural changes in economy and demography, the dominance of environmental policy and local independency in decision making is superseded by an increasing external dominance resulting from processes of economic transformation and dependency on external development factors.

These are the lessons Berlin will have to learn; lessons other regions have learned in opening their local environments to outside forces and thus expanding their networks of interaction. Disadvantages generated by a loss of local influence on regional governance will be compensated by a strengthening of the development capacities of the region as a whole. Intensified economic links, inter-firm co-operation and inter-regional transfers of knowledge can then substitute the former closed system based on subsidies.

In the following, I would like to discuss Berlin’s structural situation after the “fall of the wall” by focusing on two different spatial levels: the inter-urban and the intra-urban. On both levels I will point out major mistakes made in the beginning of the last decade and which will delay Berlin’s adjustment to real conditions of the economic restructuring process. Pressures for regional adaptation are being generated by globalisation, the formation of a unified Europe, the expansion of cities, and, finally, modern information and communication technologies. At present, all these processes tend to lead to further polarisation within urban and regional hierarchies. There is a continuous gap between cities and regions capable of participating in these processes and those that are largely excluded. Competition for opportunities to exploit future trends is increasing and cities and regions are becoming split into those which are networked more with global partners than with their direct environments, and those “introverted” areas that tend to lose out (Minx).
Mistake I: The Misunderstanding of Global Processes

The first mistake can be seen in the decision to bet on the continued prosperity of production sectors that were successful in the past. In both parts of the city the secondary sector clearly made up a large portion of the labour market and contributed to regional and dominance. Officials ignored that fact that, in market terms, industrial output in the East (E) was based on low-tech and large-scale industries, low qualification standards, an artificial state of full employment, and on products at the end of their product cycle. The economic output of the West (W) displayed similar characteristics with medium tech but small scale industries, average qualification standards and high hidden unemployment based on subsidies and tax-reduction. To avoid a high degree of structural unemployment and in order not to jeopardise German unification in its early stages, it seemed imperative to restructure the traditional economic base. But in politically protected economies such as those in the eastern and western parts of Berlin it was hard to accept that job-turnover, even in successful businesses, dropped on the average to only 12 years. The situation in weak and dependent industries was, of course, much worse.

The decisive factor in a competitive market is the level of innovation associated with production and products. Loss of time in innovation processes is irreversible and cannot be compensated in the long-term by price-manipulation, employment cutbacks or tax holidays. The consequences are obvious: the more time that passes by the more likely that short-termism takes hold, seriously impinging upon regional integration.

It is precisely this situation that has prevailed in the Berlin region since unification. The model depicted in Figure 2 first indicates the state and dynamic of both W and E system development. This model includes a time scale showing different stages of integration of the two systems. In the W situation the transformation of the economy during the 80’s affected not only the quality of production advantages but also the locations of production. Old industrialised regions became polarised, their peripheries even more so, while only newer growth poles, and their peripheries in particular, profited from polarisation reversal. The principle of flexible production has thus promoted new multilateral regional exchanges that decompose the former multilevel regional hierarchy.

In the same period the E-situation was characterised by persistent centralisation, creating one hegemonic core and a functionally disarticulated periphery.

In the E case, the transformation process resulting from political unification initiated a re-orientation of economic principles towards the market, a re-distribution of regional responsibility, and a re-organisation of a multi-level hierarchies. Because of the extensive backlog in demand for consumption and investment goods, the same process slowed the western transformation process and with it a recovery of the old production advantages, especially in the North of Germany. This trend would appear to breathe new life into the old North-South regional hierarchy. The re-development of the old growth poles is thus promoted by an exploitation of East German regions which have become dependent on foreign control. Instead of seizing the opportunity to promote a new and competitive regional hierarchy, the East is more or less being “colonialised”.

Problems have been caused by the time constraints presented by strategic and expedient political aspects of the unification agenda. Short-term concepts have contributed to dependency rather than to a culture of networking while the development of endogenous bases for more dynamic development will require time. As a result, polarisation will proceed apace.

So much for the starting point of unification in relation to further evolutionary processes. While generous West-East transfers (governmental support, re-distribution of government-
tal institutions, initiation of institutional frameworks, and setting up high-tech communication and transportation networks) continue operating, dissatisfaction has increased in the now dependent Eastern peripheries. These regions face long-term unemployment, social discrimination, on-going de-industrialisation, indeed an entire set of negative conditions that leave many job-seekers little option than either to leave or remain as welfare recipients. Ironically, the dissolution of former value systems and of household structures express themselves in political pressure which is mainly compensated by increases in subsidies. The effect, however, is that the imbalance between labour costs, standards of living, productivity and competitiveness increases as well.

The scenarios for further development will depend very much on the time-frames within which these imbalances can be eliminated.

Let us discuss different types of development tempi and their potential structural outcomes:

- In the E-System, high speed and high intensity development would create state of the art technologies and chances for network development via polarisation reversal but also a loss of regional identity. Investors from outside would realise “pioneer” profits and replace regional elites.

- Low speed and moderate development in the E-system, by contrast, would allow endogenous potentials to develop, but with an increase in interregional disparities. Eastern regions, their core and peripheries, would thus suffer double polarisation and remain subordinate in an increasingly hierarchical organisation.

- The interdependent effects within the W-system would not cause the same range of results. Low speed and moderate development in the E stabilizes the old and new growth poles in the W-system. The urban network of multilateral regional exchange continues to develop.

- High speed and intensive development in the E can turn become inverted by shifting some gravity potential from W to E. This scenario will not change the general pattern of urban system organisation in the W, but it might reduce the competitive potential of the new growth poles located in the S in the European and global context. In the same way, it also might reduce the potential of the old cores to restructure and enhance competitiveness.

Unfortunately, the worst possible variant of these scenarios has in fact happened in the case of the Five New Länder and Berlin (Fig. 3). As is shown in the next figure, the trading focus of Berlin, Brandenburg and of Eastern Germany in general is clearly westward – within the European Union, Asia and USA. The commercial networks are still weak in Central and Eastern Europe – despite hopes of serving the Eastern market. Almost all of the conditions necessary for Berlin-Brandenburg to promote itself as an interregional and international nexus of economic activity are thus missing (Kujath). Only 11.5% of Berlin’s exports and 12.6% of its imports are destined for Eastern Europe and the per capita export volume with regard to Eastern Europe is much lower than the German national average. This means that East-West trade bypasses the Berlin region. The main networks are linked to the principal industrial centres of Western Europe.

The main reason for this is that the regional basis for East-West inter-sectoral trade is lacking in competitive advantage. Both the low-level trade infrastructure and the general economic weakness expressed by low value-added production and high unemployment rates do not indicate that Berlin can rescue itself from external domination. Despite considerable potential in R&D, fifty years of isolation have caused Berlin to lose much of its entrepreneurial and technological dynamics as well as its ability to improve its knowledge base and to attract foreign investment and economic control centres. To reach at least a level of foreign direct investment as high as that of the Rhine-Main region around Frankfurt,
Düsseldorf or Hamburg, about three times higher than at present, Berlin will require time to establish similar international connections. But to compete at the same level with London or Paris is an illusion supported only by political wishful thinking.

Because externally (i.e. western) dominated firm subsidiaries are the principle foundation of the Berlin-Brandenburg economy, national and multinational enterprises, rather the region itself, are the main source of capital and know-how. These companies are not embedded in regional networks in terms of input and output factors; they remain foreign bodies within the regional economy and generate few multiplier effects. However, these firms are to a large extent competitive as well as knowledge, technology and capital intensive; structurally and functionally they remain in sharp contrast to the marginalized traditional economy and to the fragile nascent endogenous sector. While the transplants operate transregionally, the latter serve only local markets. This dual economy is not dissimilar to the situation found in developing countries.

Only a few industrial clusters based on research and professional services such as transportation-, medical-, bio-, communication-technology or multimedia have developed internationally competitive structures. However, this development is overshadowed by the process of out-migration of industries which is expected to amount to about two-thirds of the existing total. In 1999 alone Berlin lost about 25,000 jobs in this way. It is hoped that job-creation will reach levels that compensate for these losses. In fact, Berlin is following the same path of restructuring which began in Western Germany at least 15 years earlier. Cities such as Hamburg, Munich or Cologne are far ahead in all growth-relevant service sectors. Even Leipzig and Dresden show structural advantages compared to Berlin in this respect.

Conditions for regional economic development in Berlin have greatly improved over the last few years thanks to large transfer payments for the development of all kinds of infrastructure. However, it appears that the creation of genuine competitive advantages, such as in the form of firms co-operating and competing within an endogenously driven industrial cluster, cannot be achieved simply by improvements in infrastructure and transfers (Kujath). Cook and Morgan describe the key elements of the "networking region" as a thick layering of public and private industrial support institutions, high grade labour market intelligence, rapid diffusion of technologies, a high degree of inter-firm networking, and receptive firms positively disposed towards innovation.

Mistake II: Berlin’s Design as a Production Space

As pointed out, the first mistake in managing the development of post-unification Berlin was based on the misunderstanding of changing general conditions affecting economic growth: i.e. time frames and networking at the regional level.

The second mistake, to be elaborated below, has to do with a misunderstanding of shifting general conditions governing economic and social organisation at the local level. Up to recent years, Berlin officials conceived the urban area of the metropolitan region in terms of a space for production in which not only agglomerations of enterprise-related services but also various local clusters of traditional industry and cultural production (media, entertainment) would accumulate. Depending on the observer’s point of view, this structure can be interpreted either in terms of Berlin’s relative backwardness compared to other metropolitan cities or as an asset, as a specific feature of the so-called Berlin mix in which the planning concepts of poly-centralisation and neighbourhood culture are reflected.

Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that Berlin has not been particularly successful in developing a local economy with internal coherence and innovative capacity. Nor has the city been able to nurture high quality co-op-
erative relationships with regional, national and global partners. As a consequence, the city has not been able to fulfil expectations of economic development despite its reinstatement as national capital and hopes of a renaissance as an important production location. On the contrary, the main tendency emerging from Berlin’s restructuring is social polarisation. The hope for a position in the global concert was and remains far too optimistic as processes of globalisation had shaped new urban hierarchies at least 10 years before unification in 1990. The role of capital city appears to attract only corporate divisions and secondary directional centres. In the meantime, political power is gradually shifting to Brussels and the European Union. Within this context, Berlin’s present development can be characterised as structural adjustment towards a service metropolis (i.e. professional services) similar to the structure of the leading German and European metropolitan regions.

When analysing the economic profile of Berlin we can ascertain that core sectors of urban regional economies account for only 33% of Berlin’s total employment (Fig. 4). Employment change in these sectors, such as finance, professional services, cultural products, R&D-intensive industries and some traditional manufacturing sectors, shows an overall negative trend except for professional services. However, in Berlin’s case this sector reflects a large backlog demand compared to other leading German cities. The two industrial sectors each lost more than 20% in terms of employment in just three years between 1993 and 1996. This trend can be better understood when compared with overall developments in Germany. This is shown in Figure 5. Shift-share analysis reveals a negative regional component for virtually all the sub-sectors of Berlin’s economy. This means that Berlin has fallen well behind in terms of the potential increases in employment. The comparatively favourable development in the professional services in Germany as a whole cannot compensate for job losses in the other defining sectors. This general negative trend in the core sectors matches the negative regional component in the professional service sector.

When comparing Berlin with its national competitors we find – based on location quotients – that Berlin is far behind in the development of these core sectors and, unfortunately, leading in all innovation-poor sectors, especially in public services and construction. The main structural problem is that there is no coherence between the production sector and professional services and therefore no multiplier effects. Indeed, there is no real evidence as to how much real progress is being made in networking in terms of developing an innovative regional economy, especially in the link-up of research and production and the formation of regional clusters.

The existence of regional clusters of economic sectors is an expression of how close firms are interlinked and able to exploit local agglomeration advantages (Fig. 5). Spatial concentration and sectoral agglomeration data shown in the second and third column of Figure 5 indicate a maximum for the financial sector, where 85% of all institutions are concentrated in the inner core. The cultural products sector follows in degree of spatial concentration with an agglomeration percentage of 67%. Quite similar are figures for professional services. Somewhat less concentrated, but still with a high degree of agglomeration, are the two industrial sectors. Altogether, the Berlin inner urban core is still a major production space, although this will certainly change as pressure to re-locate to suburban areas intensifies.

Economic polarisation caused by structural change is also reflected in Berlin’s social makeup (Fig. 6). The mistake of placing high urban development stakes on a “renaissance” of traditional industries is thus repeated by planning practices that attempt to recreate classical socio-economic patterns. This is demonstrated by the the ring-radial pattern shown in Figure 7 below. At present, under the stress of polarisation, cities tend to fragment into independent islands of socially specialised groups. This process is based on flexible accumulation which creates new locational patterns and re-
Regional interactions. New urban hierarchies emerge with transformed internal economic structures; polycentric regions are created while the ring-radial pattern dissolves into smaller specialised fragments. This is shown by the green areas in Figure 7.

Cities embedded in the global system tend to develop dualised structures, with the “global” village forming the new core, and the “local” village representing sub-areas with different degrees of specialisation. The interactions between these areas are sometimes more intense than those that characterised relationships between the former core and its sub-centres. Zones of gentrification and ghettoisation reflect the interface between the new core, based on global functions, and sub-cores containing dispersed local functions. In this way, as the sub-cores become specialised, highly segregated social groups and new household types come to terms with these new cores. Within the dual city pattern, the formerly suburban zones receive a partial local centrality while former core areas tend to slip structurally into the vast new urban periphery.

If we relate this restructuring process to migration patterns in Berlin after unification, we can anticipate a superimposition of at least four different migration processes, each resulting in a different spatial pattern (Fig. 8). The first two processes belong to the changes within the local level while the other two represent the influence of the global scale. In the following, I will focus only on two types of migration processes: these relate to the integration (or merger) of the two former independent economic systems (green lines), the new urbanism (red line) and therefore also to displacements (blue line). These hypotheses assume that other migration flows in the E-W integration process will not be of significance.

- In the first case, that of merger, we anticipate a leap-frogging pattern of flows between E / W subsystems and their associated hinterlands. The related spatial pattern depends either on the existing socio-ecological pattern in the West or on the future housing market potential which is redeveloped in the East. The reason for this hypothesis lies in the re-establishment of the core areas and their specialised functions and in the new integration of the former suburban zones into the migration system.

- In the second case - the new urbanism and displacement - we anticipate a new internal order of spatially fragmented global and local villages. The islands of gentrification are particularly significant in displacing the former zone of transition towards the new urban periphery and segregating people into various marginalized groups. The top groups originate from global in-migrants and local elites and tend to concentrate within either the gentrified zones or the traditional upper-income sector in the SW of Berlin. The “bottom” groups are ghettoised in the ecliptic zones within the polycentric structure of the quartered city.

To what extent does the empirical evidence back up these hypothetical assumptions?

**Empirical Evidence**

The first diagram indicates population dynamics; we see a slight increase for the year 1995 and a decrease in following years (Fig. 8). This loss of population has increased the flexibility of the migratory system within the city. Consequently, the internal migration volume has increased as well. While the overall migration volume for the first three years under investigation was below average (shown in the lower half of figure 8), the inter-district migration volume for the last four years is above average, i.e. the adjustment process between E and W started with some delay.

The next step in the analysis is based on the function of distance. In theory, distance has a
negative impact on the propensity to migrate (Fig. 9). The map shows the related pattern of districts. Distance acts as a stronger migration deterrent for affluent districts such as those in the SW of Berlin. People in the E tend to migrate further distances (mainly red colours) than people in the West (mainly blue colours). This reflects spatial adjustments of higher income groups from the E and is thus in step with the new urbanism. However, there is a marked edge effect. People at the outer districts tend to migrate further distances than people in the centre of the city. This reflects leap-frogging to new gentrified areas.

How strong the merger between W and E districts has developed during the 90’s is shown in the next series of maps (Fig. 10). Assuming classical socio-economic patterns are valid in characterising urban space, intra-urban migrations should follow the traditional social continuum from the centre to the periphery. In this case we can analyse residual spatial patterns within the sectoral radial links based on a logical model. The maps display the spatial distribution of the residuals and show with the red colours positive average residuals which underexaggerate the actual flows. At the same time, the negative residuals (blue colours) overexaggerate real migration flows.

In 1991, there were only slight positive and negative residuals linking the E and W districts. This means that the model fits well to the real interdistrict migration flows and – because of the radial cut between the two former systems – the social barriers prevent an invasion from E to W and vice versa. Only for the district of Wedding, located North of the centre, do we find a darker colour indicating some social interaction between E and W. Dark colours are only found within the W and E system, not between the systems. Overprediction characterised both core areas and under-prediction increased towards the periphery. Thus, no E-W migration was anticipated by the model, an assumption supported by analysis.

By 1997 the whole system had stabilised in the W and was nearer stabilisation between E and W. Within the E system there are still major adjustments as yet to be considered theoretically (Fig. 11).

Comparing the two development stages (1991 and 1997), the results indicate a strong re-structuring of the core area, a process of stabilisation within the W radial pattern, a more long-term emergence of equivalent patterns in the East because of the re-introduction of true housing markets, and few links between E and W. This last result will now be tested in the analysis below.

If people in the E and W have the same propensity to migrate either to the W or to the E, as well as within each sub-system, then all spatial subsystem parameters would not differ significantly from zero (Fig. 12). The estimates indicate, however, that people in the W are more mobile than in the E. By contrast, the interaction levels across the E-W-boundaries are below expectation. Again, people in the E are less likely to move to the W than the other way around. These estimates clearly indicate that there is still a psychological barrier in the minds of “Easterners” and “Westerners” to cross the former wall.

However, the gap between E and W with respect to interaction within and across subsystem boundaries is narrowing over time, a trend indicated in the lower half of the OH. There is a trend towards a steady-state, except for the decreasing interaction within the Western subsystem. This can be related to the new nucleus of the global village.

The results in the local level clearly show that the expectations and the chances of an E-W-merger are very limited. The same structure holds for the E and W sub-systems because of ongoing poly-centralisation and fragmentation within the radial pattern. In this respect, on the micro-scale, planning operated as if Berlin were still in a period of high consumption, with the central market in full control of its surround-
ings. To reduce the W-E disparities the result can not be found in back and forth migration. The result can only be seen in the opening of the walls in the hearts and minds of the population, including politicians, investors, or visitors. The gap between political goals and reality looks still as a deep valley which can only be traversed when trust develops on both sides.

A simulation of the future development of Berlin as to the six key factors economy, society, politics, land use, infrastructure, and environment indicates the present stage in development (yellow colour): while five of the six factors are balanced out in harmony to each other, the general economy remains in a deep depression (Fig. 13).

- This will change in a first future stage, indicated by the solid line. The economy based on an improved level of infrastructure will grow when the influence of politics shrinks by deregulation, and when social polarisation and environmental issues are temporarily de-emphaised in decision-making.

- The next stage in the scenario development is indicated by the dotted line. With ongoing economic growth society becomes strongly fragmented in terms of the incoherent spatial and social patterns. Political influence on development wanes while the direct access to infrastructure is reserved only for the global winners.

**Conclusion: the Learning Effect**

What can we learn from Berlin’s story? We need to discuss the long-term effects of decision making processes and to have in mind that decisions are based on yesterdays structures and experiences, are made to day and show their consequences tomorrow. But changes and adjustment are not possible without learning from experience and bridging dividing barriers. More specific:

- Time plays an important role in shaping adjustment processes.
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Berlin’s Situation in the view of Statements (1993)

Diepgen, E. September and October are the month of fate for future development

SONY We aren’t willing to invest into a province capital

DEBIS If we don’t act, who else?

Kupsch (Broker) Up to now: nothing has taken place what could change Berlin into a national or international centre of Services.

Sinatra, F. Persons who have been successful in New York or Berlin will be successful every where.

Colany, L. Berlin is the most brainless city of the world after the brain drain from 1933 onwards.

Witt, K. Berlin needs a Vision like Olympia

Becker, B. Berlin’s population needs time to recover.

Source: © G. Braun, 2000
### Berlin’s Import and Export in 1998 in Million DM

<table>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>9,746</td>
<td>+18.6</td>
<td>13,802</td>
<td>+2.9</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>6,238</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>-24.7</td>
<td>1,077</td>
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<td>570</td>
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Source: © G. Braun, 2000
Shift Analysis of Berlin's Regional Economic Development 1993-1996

Change in 1000 Employees

-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15

Economic Sectors

Cultural Products Sector
R&D-intensive Industries
Traditional Industries
Finance Sector
Enterprise-related Services
Building and Energy Sector
Transport Sector
Trade Sector
Consumption-related Sector
State Sector

Real Change
Structural Component
Regional Component

Source: © G. Braun, 2000
Fig. 6

Rates of spatial concentration in the profile shaping economic sectors of Berlin (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Spatial concentration</th>
<th>Agglomeration Rate in %</th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
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<tr>
<td>Finance Sector</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>279</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Services</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1667</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D-intensive Industries</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Industries</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>Cultural Products Sector</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Krätke, St. (1998, p.127)
GLOBAL - LOCAL VILLAGE

Source: © G. Braun, 2000
Fig. 8

HYPOTHETICAL MIGRATION PATTERN

1. REGULAR PATTERN
2. DISPLACEMENT
3. NEW URBANISM
4. E-W - INTEGRATION

Source: © G. Braun, 2000
Fig. 9a

Population dynamics in Berlin 1991 to 1998

Fig. 9b Volume of Interdistrict Migration
Fig. 11a
Interdistrict Migration 1991

Fig. 11b Interdistrict Migration 1992

Fig. 11c

Interdistrict Migration 1997

Fig. 12a

Spartial Sub-Systems

Fig. 12b

Fig. 13

Der Trauben-Typ (V):
- Kompakte Ausgangssituation ist durch gesellschaftliche Entwicklung (aufgrund der Flächennutzung) bedroht (zwischen Realität und politischen Zielen liegt das Tal der Tränen).
- Die Wahrung der Kompaktheit kann einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung dienlich sein.
- Bsp.: Berlin, Budapest, Wien (Prag)

Source: © S. Carsten, Diplomarbeit 1999
Conclusion

- Time plays an important role in the process of adjustment
- Politics should concentrate more the search for vertical and horizontal multiplier effects based on inter-linkages and co-operation than on regulation
- Only marked proved economies shape competitive regions. Inter-linked or bridged regions should function via a common marketing strategy instead of a permanent tearing to pieces of what is common

Source: © G. Braun, 2000
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