MASTER THESIS

Access to Drinking Water and Stakeholder Action - Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon from a Political-Ecological Perspective
Case Study: Upper Mefou Watershed, Cameroon

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Abstract

Cameroon faces various challenges. One of them is the problem of access to safe and sufficient drinking water under acceptable, assessable, socially and economical affordable and equitable circumstances. Under the defined understanding of Drinking Water Governance the thesis analyzes the international, national and local institutional structures, conditions as well as stakeholders regarding the drinking water management in Cameroon. The objective is a holistic presentation of the strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon. The field research has been conducted from March till June 2013 and is covered in the situation analysis of the thesis.
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>African Election Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>French Agency for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>bpb</td>
<td>Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDM</td>
<td>Cameroon People's Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTPL</td>
<td>Commission Technique de Privatisation et de Liquidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Dynamique Citoyenne</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eng</td>
<td>English</td>
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<td>Fr</td>
<td>French</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GII</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<td>GESP</td>
<td>Growth and Employment Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>GMG</td>
<td>Gaya Media Group</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>German Trade &amp; Investment</td>
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<td>GWP</td>
<td>Global Water Partnership</td>
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<td>GWP-Cmr</td>
<td>Global Water Partnership Cameroon</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ICWE</td>
<td>International Conference on Water and the Environment</td>
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<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWRM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>JME</td>
<td>Journée Modial de l'Eau, Eng = International Water Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPSHU</td>
<td>Lettre de politique sectorielle de l'hydraulique urbaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDR</td>
<td>Movement for the Defence of the Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINADER</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINATD</td>
<td>Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINCOMMERCE</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEE</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Energy, Fr = Ministère de l'Eau et de l'Energie</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINEP</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and the Protection of Nature</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINEPAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINEPIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Livestock, Fishery and Animal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINFI</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINHUD</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINIMIDT</td>
<td>Ministry of Mine, Industry and Technological Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINRESI</td>
<td>Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINREX</td>
<td>Ministry of International Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINSAN</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Renaissance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>National Water Committee</td>
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| PAEPAR       | Water Supply and Sanitation Program in Rural Areas  
Fr = Programme d’Approvisionnement en Eau Potable et Assainissement en milieu Rural |
| PAWD-II      | Second Phase of the Partnership for Africa’s Water Development |
| PDUE         | Urban and Water Development Project |
| PFP          | Policy Framework Papers |
| PM           | Prime Minister |
| PNDP         | National Participative Development Program  
Fr = Programme National de Développement Participatif |
| PRSP         | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PRC          | Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon |
| PSP          | Private Sector Participation |
| SDF          | Social Democratic Front |
| SNEC         | National Water Company of Cameroon  
Fr = Société Nationale des Eaux du Cameroun |
| TAU          | Technical Assistance Unit |
| TI           | Transparency International |
| TWC          | Transnational Water Corporation |
| UDC          | Union for Democracy and Change |
| UMW          | Upper Mefou Watershed |
| UNESCO-IHE   | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization - Institute for Water Education |
| UNDP         | United Nations Development Program |
| UNDP¹        | National Union for Democracy and Progress |
| UNDP WGF     | UNDP Water Governance Facility |
| UNW-DPAC     | UN-Water Decade Program on Advocacy and Communication |
| WDM          | World Development Movement |
| WSP          | Water and Sanitation Program |
| WSS          | Water Supply & Sanitation |
| WWC          | World Water Council |
| WWF          | World Water Forum |
| YVE   | Young Volunteer Environment |
1 Introduction and Objective

Water is conceptualized on the one hand by its physical flow and on the other hand by rules, social practices and political and socio-economic aspects (BAKKER 2003). Further, water is “a symbol of identity, power and citizenship” (MOSSE 2008:948) and according to GRAEFE (2006) drinking water is a symbol of power demarcation. Therefore the management of drinking water is not just influenced by natural or scientific-technical factors; it is also highly influenced by society as well as social relations of power and culture (CONCA 2006; MOSSE 2008; TRUELOVE 2011 cf. HEYEN ET AL 2006). The “[...] links between control and access to water and social relations of power [...] are neither socially, nor ecologically neutral (TRUELOVE 2011:144 cf. SWYNGEDEOUW ET AL. 2002). In addition to it, the access to water in the Global South may distinguish from gender (O’REILLY ET AL. 2009) and intra-community and intra-household differences, which correlate with labour, health problems and (illegal) practice to obtain water (TRUELOVE 2011). Unequal access possibilities to drinking water remain a problem also for post 2015 MDGs. Globally it became clear that the allocation of fresh water in most areas is less a problem of physical water scarcity than more a problem of economical water scarcity. Mismanagement and poor governance lay at the heart of the world’s water crisis (ROGERS & HALL 2003). The governance of available drinking water resources becomes a key issue to achieve water security at local, national and international level (UNDP 2013b). ROGERS & HALL (2003) states effectiveness of water governance is in many places of the world undermined by poor management, corruption, lack of appropriate institutions, bureaucratic inertia, insufficient capacity and shortage of investment. The same in Cameroon: Cameroon is the second country in Africa (after the Democratic Republic of Congo) in terms of quantity of “available” water resources, estimated to be three times the world’s average (7,000 m³), but the access to water still remains a scarce resource because of inadequate management practice (MAFANY & FANTONG 2006). This is a consequence of missing formal and cohesive water policy, poor infrastructure and maintenance of it as well as a weak uncoordinated institutional framework composed out of a multitude of stakeholders with low human and financial capacity (GWP 2009D, 2010; CONFERENCES: JME 22.03.2013 & PANGIRE
16.04.2013). The question, which was guiding the research, is what are the causes of that situation and what are the conditions, structures, stakeholders and interrelations promoting the mismanagement and insufficient access to drinking water. The answer goes back to historical influence, power related issues, theory and practice of legal situation, the proportion of formal and informal institution, stakeholder interests, capacities, willingness as well as power from the international, national and sub-national level.

1.1 Research Background and Motivation

The research is realized through a DAAD financed program “Welcome to Africa” in the framework of a cooperation project “Enhancing collaborative research and development capacities of German and African Partners on Integrated Watershed Management (IWM R&D CB)”. It is a project in cooperation with the Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), United Nations University (Germany), Kenyatta University (Kenya), University of Cape Town (South Africa), University Yaoundé (Cameroon) and the consultancy IWM Expert. The overall objective of this project aims at strengthening information and knowledge transfer among the different stakeholder groups with regard to IWM. German students, graduates and young academics are sent to one of the mentioned African universities for a study or research stay. The fieldwork for this research took place in Cameroon in collaboration with the department of Geography at the University of Yaoundé I.

1.2 Aim and Posing Question

Based on the described problem of the lack of provision and access to drinking water in Cameroon the research focused on the structures and stakeholders in the related sector to create a knowledge base, which is afterwards tried to be analyzed under self-defined components and indicators of Drinking Water Governance (DWG). The final objective is to identify the strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) (SWOT) in the functional chain of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon. Thereby the research tries to approach the topic from a holistic perspective, which contributes to understand the SWOTs in the DWG in Cameroon.
The analysing framework divides the research into two main components. The first one is the Situation Analysis (1) focusing on the conditions, institutional structures and stakeholders on three levels - international, national and local one in the DWG in Cameroon. Each level is discussed in a single chapter (chapter 4 till 6). The second steps is the Result Analysis (2) subdivided in the assessment of the elaborated DWG components (2.1) as well as the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats elaboration of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon (2.2) (Figure 3–1).

The aim of the international chapter 4 is to present the global scope of action in which the Cameroonian Drinking Water Governance is embedded. Subsequently the national context is analysed in chapter 5 subdivided into: conditions and structures from inside and outside the water sector as well as stakeholders influencing the DWG in Cameroon. Then the local level is examined in chapter 6 by the case study of the Upper Mefou Watershed (UMW).

The chapters’ three till six are each concluded with a sub-chapter called critical reflection. The focal point is on the power related issues, interests, capacities and governance structures rather than on chemical, hydrological and technical issues of drinking water like a multitude of researchers (e.g. MAFANY ET AL. 2006; JALBA ET AL. 2010, AJEAGAH 2013, DUNNA ET. AL 2014) is doing it, which take benefit from a more detailed look into the stakeholders’ interests and strategies.

**The research is guided by the following questions:**

1) What are the causes of the technical and man-made inducted problems in the access to drinking water in Cameroon?

2) What are the influencing conditions and formal and informal institutional structures in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon on international, national and local level?

3) Who are the stakeholders in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon and what are their range of actions, interests, capacities and interpenetrations?
4) Based on research question two and three, how far are the elaborated Drinking Water Governance components applied in Cameroon? Consequently, what are the SWOTs of the Drinking Water Governance?
2 Theory

For many decades the wide social and political processes, which are involved in water systems, were ignored in research (Mosse 2008; Nuschler 2009). Likewise, a growing literature on international relations in water crisis neglected water social embeddedness to a great extent (Renner 1989; Gleick 1993; de Villiers 1999; Klare 2001; Gleick 1998; Jury & Vaux 2007). To address this gap recent geographical approaches conceptualize the complexity and relations of water systems with culture, economy, ecology, history, policy and society organizations (Metha 2005; Metha et al. 2007; Fontein 2007; Mosse 2008; Beckendorf 2010). One of them is Political-Ecology, an interdisciplinary multi-dimensional research approach that tries to address this complexity and applies the nexus of resources, politics and social sciences (Krings 2008). An important topic of the Political-Ecology is the privatization of the drinking water supply accompanied with on-going decentralization reforms (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Swyngedouw 2005; Keil & Bourdreau 2006; Krings 2008; Lieb 2013), both are comprised concepts of a neoliberal drive in the (drinking) Water Governance (Bakker 2007; Krings 1999, 2008; Mosse 2008). This development becomes apparent in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon. This chapter presents the Political-Ecology approach and Drinking Water Governance, which compose the main components of the analytical framework of this research (see sub-chapter 3.2).

2.1 Political Ecology

Water Governance regarding drinking water calls for a multidimensional approach. The understanding of Political Ecology as a multidimensional approach at the nexus of political, nature and social science (Krings 2008; Rauch 2009; Zimmer 2010b) will be used for the analysis in this research. Dependent on the literature Political Ecology is labelled as a approach or theory.

Blakie (1985) and Blakie & Brookfield (1987) mainly developed the Political Ecology by introducing the so-called “Third World Political Ecology” as the first field of research of Political Ecology (Krings 2007). In the German speaking geography it was mainly introduced by Geist (1992, 1999) and Krings (1996, 1999, 2000, 2008). The approach has its roots in the critique of...
quantitative, one-dimensional and apolitical environment research since the 1980ties and is nowadays a dominated field in geographical studies on development (Walker 2005; Krings 2008; Beckendorf 2010; Zimmer 2010b). A multitude of scientists and researchers (e.g. Krings 2000; Krings 2008; Blaikie 1999; Bakker 2007; Coy & Neuburger 2008; Hartwig 2008; Beckendorf 2010) have dealt with this approach.

Central concept

Political Ecology implies an examination of natural resources and power relations between different actors, which entitles winners as well as losers and a temporarily limited scope of action (Krings & Müller 2001; Swyngedouw 1999; Reuber 2005; Beckendorf 2010). The central concept of Political Ecology can be summarized as an analysis of resource utilization as result of political, economical and social interest constructions and power structures (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Peet & Watts 1996, 2002; Krings & Müller 2001; Krings 2008; Rauch 2009). For the social conditions and structures the institutional influence gets more important (Hartwig 2007). Beyond, the various actor interests have to be analyzed in their global, national and regional context (Krings 1999, 2008; Beckendorf 2010).

Actors

The Political Ecology is based on a human-environment relationship with a strong actor-orientation (Krings 2002; Flinter 2003; Reuber 2005; Klöpper 2009; Zimmer 2010a,b). Due to Bryant & Bailey (1997) it has to be distinguished between five main actors: states, companies, multinational organizations, NGOs and grassroots organizations. Furthermore, it can be differentiated between diversity place-based and non-place-based actors (Krings & Müller; Coy & Neuburger 2008; Krings 2008).

A key factor to understand actor relations is a power analysis between actors. Actors are equipped with unequal economical, social, cultural & discursive power, which more or less matches with the asset hexagon in the livelihood approach. Power disparities exist between different levels and within different stakeholder groups (Mirimachi & Van Wyk 2010). Actors power is related to unequal access possibilities and rights to natural resources (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Krings 1999, 2008). Action is only possible within the specific scope of action, interest, strategy and power (Bieling & Höchtei 2006; Graefe 2006;
Müller-Mahn 2006; Coy & Neuburger 2008; Krings 2000, 2008; Hartwig 2008; Rauch 2009; Beckedorf 2010; Zimmer 2010b). Rauch (2003, 2009) summarized the scope of action being influenced by different political, economical, social-cultural and ecological framework conditions for each actor. Additionally, for the research the historical, formal und informal institutional conditions become consulted.

Power means hereby the access to and control of drinking water resources as well as the interaction between other actors (Bryant & Bailey 1997).

For the problem-solution-strategy the multi-dimensional Political Ecology considers the question of power, social-system-relation and the political-economical context on a multi-spatial level (Rauch 2009). The consideration could be extended by further scope influencing factors depending on the specific problem.

Meanwhile, a range of new research approaches is coming into focus, like Urban Political Ecology or Feminist Political Ecology, where issues, which have not received public attention, are considered (Zimmer 2010b; Truelove 2011). In this context Zimmer (2010b) as well as Truelove (2011) considered the unequal access to drinking water. Thereby according to Zimmer (2010b) the concept of hybridity is particularly promising (Haraway 1991; Latour 1993; 2004; Swyngedouw 2004).

To sum up, Political Ecology is a highly dynamic research field evolved in many different directions but opens up a promising way to study water related management and governance issues. In Political Ecology especially actors and structures are crucial which is transferred in the analysing framework of this research (Figure 3–1).

### 2.2 Drinking Water Governance

Over the last decade scholars, donors and policy makers agreed that Water Governance holds the key to improve water security in southern countries (GWP 2000; Kashyap 2004; Gopalakrishnan et al. 2005; Cunha 2008, Briscoe 2009; Biswas & Tortajada 2010; OECD 2011; Aarnoudse & Belalia 2012; Araral & Wang 2013). But a coherent definition or indicators...
Even Governance in general is a broad concept, with a variety of definitions grounded on several interests of different international organisations (NUSCHLER 2009; BISWAS & TORTAJADA 2010). RAUCH (2009) describes governance as a state-community relation, which is in general about problem solutions, evolved and implemented by different actors beyond state institutions (RAUCH 2009; NUSCHLER 2009). Further CUNHA (2008) remarks governance is related to the power balance between traditions, national administration and institutions. The term Good Governance (GG) describes the objectives and conditions for sustainable development (CONZELMANN 2003) and is characterized more or less by: constitutionality, participation, transparency, accountability, equality and efficiency (RAUCH 2009) while international organizations and research institutions do also not have clear or specific definitions (CONZELMANN 2003). There is also critique rising as about the efficiency of good governance and civil society empowerment (MIRUMACHI & VANWYK 2010). Institutions are often undermined by cases of corruption and clientilism and UNDP (2013B) expresses that informal institutions can support, disrupt and replace formal ones.

To present a coherent characterization of Water Governance regarding drinking water gets even more difficult since diverse determinations by several authors (e.g. GWP 2000; TEISMANN & HERMANS 2011; GUPTA 2011; TOONEN 2011; WGF 2014) with little consensus exist (ARARAL & WANG 2013). In brief outline it deals with complex interactions in the joint domain of water (TEISMANN & HERMANS 2011). Essentially, Water Governance systems determine who gets which water, when and how and who has the right to water (UNDP 2013B).

Water Governance is described by “[…] the political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place, and which […] affect the use, development and management of water resources and the delivery of water service […] at different levels of society […]” and is also affected by decisions outside of the water sector (UNDP 2013B:3).

In this research the focus is only on drinking water. DWG is complex and calls for a multi-dimensional assessment. It is the first step to trigger changes that
are needed to improve the water sector performance (UNDP 2013b). To get the picture of (Drinking) Water Governance TEISMANN & HERMANS (2011) mentioned that the governance arrangements have to be fully understood and STEIN ET AL. (2011) adds the importance of multi-stakeholder arrangements, social dimension and institutions. This includes formal (national constitution that provides the frame for all other legislations, policies, laws and rules) as well as informal (traditional and contemporary social rules and norms that decide on water management, use and allocation) institutions and the various interactions and balance of powers between the state, civil society and the private sector (ROGERS 2006; MIRUMACHI & VANWYK 2010; UNDP 2013b).

Constructing on the understanding of Political Ecology, Governance and Water Governance: Drinking Water Governance stands in the present research for the diversity of stakeholders managing drinking water under political, social-cultural, economical and ecological conditions, which are in place. Those are influenced by historical and formal as well as informal institutional structures.

This gives an idea about what has to be considered in approaching the Water Governance of a country. Every country has its own set of governance system, stakeholder dynamics, institutional setting and ecological circumstances therefore a blueprint for the best (Drinking) Water Governance model does not exist (TEISMANN & HERMANS 2011; ARARAL & WANG 2013; UNDP 2013b). Nevertheless, the User’s Guide on Assessing Water Governance published by UNDP (2013b:8) advises to assess water governance from three main components including: (i) stakeholders and institutions to analyse power and interests,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box. 1: Trends in Governance and (Drinking) Water Governance reforms</th>
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<td>(Source: Rauch 2009; Mirumachi &amp; van Wyk 2010; UNDP 2013c)</td>
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Institutional good governance reforms come along with multiparty systems, privatization and decentralization but RAUCH (2009) describes them only as new packing of the governmental structures. Trends in water governance reforms are related to decentralization, integrated and coordinated decision making, stakeholder participation, river basin management, increased role of the private sector, PPP, water as a human right, accountability, anti-corruption as well as transparency. The trends may have a good intention but depend on the willingness, interests and capacities.
(ii) principles, in particular transparency, accountability and participation and (iii) governance performance including efficiency and effectiveness of government”.

**Box 2: Key Elements of Good Governance and Governance Performance**

Source: UNDP 2013b, WIN 2014.

The Good Governance elements (TAP) are interrelated.

**Transparency** can be understood as the level of openness of a government, the access to information and extend of public decision-making. Transparency is the precondition for accountability and participation and transparency without accountability can lead to disillusionment.

**Accountability** refers to the obligation to account for actions and activities, accept responsibilities for them and disclose the results for them in a transparent way. It can help to lead to efficient management, water resource protection and stakeholder action control.

**Participation** refers to possibility of any effected stakeholder to influence decisions at various levels. It is the precondition for social-accountability. Examples for participation are equal possibilities of attending meetings and being heard, actively contributing to and shaping of committees, votings, protests, or carrying out a referendum.

The **governance performance** is the umbrella term for being **effective** (achieving the desired results) and **efficient** (produce the results with as little input as possible) which is needed to achieve a secure drinking water delivery. The distinction is: Effectiveness is doing the right thing, while efficiency is doing things right.
3 Methodological Approach and Analytical Framework

The fieldwork and research topic was prepared with the available means of literature in Germany from January till February 2013. Nonetheless, a comprehensive analysis process depends on the local and environmental context. Based on that, the cultural, traditional and high social-interweaving background in Cameroon, and the fact that the problem of drinking water access is more influenced by governance than natural circumstances the research subject was slightly changed and adapted during the fieldwork to the topic of actors and structures in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon.

GIBSON & BROWN (2009:9) argue that all social research is neither entirely linear nor non-linear. Research is interactive and “conceptualized as ‘forms of work’ that mutually inform each other”. As remarked by GIBSON & BROWN (2009:10), this research moves from “[...] analysing data, to consulting literature, to collecting more data, to design alternative approaches, to data collection, to writing, back to analysing data and so on”. Therefore, the field research in Cameroon was conducted on a period of 05th March till 10th June 2013.

3.1 Field Methods

Based on that, the individual case study is composed by the following methods:

(i) literature research, (ii) observations in the field and in meetings, conferences and open discussion groups, (iii) experts- and household interviews and (iv) GPS detection and mapping in the study area of the Upper Mefou Watershed.

After an overview about qualitative and quantitative methods, the methods observation, expert- and household interviews will be explained in more detail in the coming sub-chapters 4.2 to 4.4.

In the social research qualitative as well as quantitative research methods are consulted (BRÜSEMEISTER 2000; BRYMAN 2003). Quantitative research defines specific variables and categories to link them together. An inflexible view and the use of statistical practice is characteristic (BRANNEN 2003; REUBER & PFAFFENBACH 2005). Qualitative research is conducted to get a broader view to understand “[...] patterns of inter-relationships [...]” (BRANNEN
2003:4) with the objective to understand the reality, which pushes or restrains people in their actions.

Qualitative and quantitative research can facilitate each other: Quantitative research allows relationships between variables. The issue is clearly defined and responses are unambiguous. Questioners, structured observation and statistic analysis are the used methods (BRANNEN 2003; BRYMAN 2003). But quantitative research is weak in exploring reasons of the relationships. Therefore, qualitative methods are used (BRYAM 2003). When answers are less clear but complex, qualitative interviews (semi as well as unstructured) may be appropriate (BRANNEN 2003; BRYMAN 2003). The methodological approach of this research is designed by a mixture of semi-structured and qualitative interviews with partly quantitative questions to enhance the comparability of results.

As presented in the theory chapter 2.1, Political-Ecology is a strong actor-oriented analysis frame that calls for an actor analysis methodology. Central for a qualitative research is the openness of the research process (BRÜSEMEISTER 2000; BRANNEN 2003; KRUKE & RAUH 2005; GIBSON & BROWN 2009). This and the adaptation of a reflective research process was tried to influence the interview-, memo-, observation- as well as discussion work. The pre-selection of interview partners is taken by the orientation on the theoretical frame of Political-Ecology including different levels and groups of actors.

3.1.1 Expert Interviews

Expert interviews are a section of qualitative research and serve the understanding of complex coherences (GLÄSER & LAUDEL 2004). The focus is on a certain topic and target group but not on specific methods. Expediently, expert interviews are conducted as semi-structured interviews (MEUSER & NAGEL 2009). The base for a semi-structured interview are central questions, the chronological order is thus less important. The advantage is to focus on several questions and react to certain responses (ATTESLANDER 2008) thereby common questions and specific questions are adapted to the expert knowledge (KRUKER & RAUH 2005).
In this work, all considered experts are involved in the drinking water sector but with different specializations, which allows a broader view on the drinking water sector. Added together, 16 semi-standardized and partly structured expert interviews are carried out (Table A-1). The first contacts with experts were made at the ‘Jour Modela De l’Eau’ Conference (22.03.2013), which had led to further contacts by the snowball principle or ‘gatekeeper-function’ (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005). Most of the contacts were made directly by visiting the experts in their office since the response to or the availability of e-mail is not strongly enlarged in Cameroon.

3.1.2 Household Interviews

The household interviews are accomplished in a study area called Upper Mefou Watershed (an introduction to the watershed is presented in chapter 6; Figure 6–1). A one-month participant observation period was preceded to get an insight in the living environment of the villagers, organization in the watershed and to get in touch with the chiefs of the villages to develop confidence to get the permission for household interviews. All in all 46 household interviews were done in the period of March till June 2013. Thereby the first two interviews in the village Ekong are used to enhance a general overview to prepare an adapted questioner, they are not implemented in the analysis. Due to the watershed extension of 97 km², the chosen approach was to focus on one deputy village each in the north, south, west and east of the watershed. Therefore, the villages Nouma, Ekong, Ebout-Mefou and Mikoameyos are chosen for this work. For the overview, one deputy interview conducted in Ozome II and four in Nkolbisson are included in the work. All in all 44 household interviews are considered for the analysis.

The approached methodology for the fieldwork on local level is the application of semi-standardized questionnaires. This approach of consultation is used to gather empirical facts, knowledge, estimations and needs of the households. The four pages questionnaire is composed out of central questions concerning the household structure, income sources, social networks, drinking water access and the awareness of the Mefou dam reconstruction and the public water company CamWater. Observation notes are added to the questionnaire. The
semi-standardized questionnaire afforded on the one hand the possibility to
gather comparable data and on the other hand to be flexible to enquire on sev-
eral aspects in a more detailed way. For two reasons the household interviews
were accompanied by either the Cameroonian project coordinator Mr Fuemba
or the in the IWM R&D CB project involved students: Firstly due to security
issue and secondly due to the lack of local language and knowledge. All inter-
views were translated from either French or the local dialect into English.

3.1.3 Observations
The observation research is an important part of the analysis and conducts to
the understanding of actions and the context in the Cameroonian drinking wa-
ter sector. Frequently, this is expressed as gaining insight into the insiders’
point of view to get a broader concern (EMERSON 1983). Simply said, it is used
to understand how things happen. The observation work is distinguished be-
tween unstructured and structured as well as participant and non-participant
forms:

1. Meetings number among: IWM R&D CB project group meetings (al-
mong every Monday from March to May 2013), project coordinator-
researcher meetings (frequently during the week).

2. Watershed observations (mainly March, 16th April 2013 and during
household interviews)

3. Open discussions: with experts from GIZ and WWF (several times
from March till June 2013), at the workshop organized by Dynamique
Citoyenne concerning urban areas suffering from drinking water short-
ages (18-22.03.2013) and with citizens of Yaoundé.

4. Conferences participation at: Jour Modela De l’Eau Conference (JME
22.03.2013), Plan d’Action National de la Gestion Integree des
Ressources en Eau au Cameroon (PANGIRE 16.04.2013)

5. Participation Observation at the: International Women’s Day
(08.03.2013), Drinking Water Access Demonstration with bukets and
cans in Nkoldongo-Yaoundé (22.03.2013), National Day (01.06.2013),
Labour Day (01.05.2013) and daily life in an urban Cameroonian family.


The observations as well as interview and questionnaire data are implemented in the analysis. The interviews are saved on CD and are attached to this work.

3.2 Analytical Framework: SWOT Analysis based on Political Ecology and Drinking Water Governance

The analytical framework is based on the multi-dimensional theory of Political Ecology and Drinking Water Governance, which says that access to drinking water depends on the political, socio-cultural, economic and ecological conditions as well as historical and informal and formal institutions which determine the scope of action of the various stakeholders. The scope of actions, interests and capacities has to be analyzed at different levels (namely the international, national and local level). All together constitute the base to design a benchmark of components in the Drinking Water Governance and to finally make a point to the SWOTs in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon.

In general, the analytical framework is divided into two steps: The Situation Analysis (1) and building on that the Result Analysis (2). The Result Analysis is once more subdivided in two other steps (2.1 and 2.2).

The technical and man-mad inducted problem of access to drinking water represents the centre of the Situation Analysis and is therefore the initial point for the presented research.

To avoid confusions, the following remarks are made:

• For the analysing framework the term actor (chapter 2.1) is replaced by stakeholder since it is not coherently used in the literature and as UNDP (2013b:10) states “[…] stakeholders are the actors.”.

• Structures and institutions are as well not clear distinguished in theory and researches. Hence the term “institutional structures” is chosen.

• In the case of Cameroon the ecological dimension stands solely for the allocation of freshwater resources and climatological conditions.
• Instead of the focus on the regional level (chapter 2.1) (KRINGS 1999, BECKEDORF 2010) the research uses the term local level, which represents the villages in the Upper Mefou Watershed.

Figure 3–1: Analysing Framework of Drinking Water Governance
Source: OTT 2014.

- 1 Situation Analysis: Conditions, Institutional Structures and Stakeholders' Analysis in the Drinking Water Governance:

The first step is important to analyse the stakeholders and institutional structures from the international, national and local level perspective. In contrast to the theory of Political Ecology, the analysis of the political, socio-cultural, economic and ecological conditions, on national and local level, from outside and inside the water sector is separately added as an analyse element. This approach is chosen since as shown in the chapter 2 a clear distinction is not given/defined.

The first step relates to answer the research question two and three.
• 2.1 Result Analysis: Benchmark of Drinking Water Governance Components in Cameroon

Water Governance regarding drinking water calls for a multidimensional approach and could therefore be linked to the multidimensional approach of Political Ecology as presented with the results of the first pillar.

Specific components and indicators of DWG are elaborated, based on the literature review (GWP 2000; Teismann & Hermans 2011; Gupta 2011; Toonen 2011 & UNDP 2013b) and access to information during the fieldwork in Cameroon. The components are adapted after Water Governance components by UNDP (2013b) (chapter 2.2) and extended by the human right to water (chapter 4.2, Box 3) as shown in Figure x. The elaborated components and their indicators of DWG are presented in Table 7-2.

The benchmark of the DWG components and their indicators built on the results of the Situation Analysis (1). The benchmark is integrated in the SWOTs of Drinking Water Governance.

• 2.2 Result Analysis: SWOT analysis of Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon
Finally, step 2.2 represents the analysis results of the SWOTs in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon for which the information from step 1 and 2.1 provide the base of information. With step 2.1 and 2.2 question four will be answered.

3.3 Critical Reflection

For this chapter the raising question is how objective are qualitative research? DIEKMANN (2007) criticized that in qualitative researches error sources are not adequately thermalized. In that course the researcher has to be aware of the fact that the own research and results may be constructed by personal expectations, prejudices and interpretations (BERGER & LUCKMANN 1994; REUBER & PFAFFENBACH 2005), which raises the problem of comparability and objectivity of qualitative researches (MEIER KRUKER & RAUH 2005; REUBER & PFAFFENBACH 2005). A priori, interacting partners mutually influence a talk by personal interest thereby power relations can be arranged. The interviewed person acts generally in a certain institutional context, which defines the scope of talk and information exchange (GIBSON & BROWN 2009). These circumstances are reflected in interviews and lead to partly personally influenced answers.

Unfortunately, beyond it has to be admitted that two further circumstances affect the objectivity of this research: After the expert interview with the deputy of the NGO Young Volunteer for Environment was accomplished on 25th March 2013, the dictaphone got broken and couldn’t be replaced. All further interviews were carried out by written notes combined with electronic recording and memos directly after the interview was taken. For that reason unfocused transcription was chosen, where the “basic intended meaning” is recorded (GIBSON & BROWN 2009:116). In the end, the conversation quality was just slightly affected by this context.

Concerning the household interviews, they are a good base to get an overview of the access to drinking water and structures in the Upper Mefou Watershed but are not representative for the whole quite diverse country. The entire watershed could not be examined due to the huge extension of the study area.
The household survey presents a good base of knowledge, which is important to understand the topic considered in this work.

The analysing framework bears the challenge to have a logical frame, which clarifies the approach to the multifaceted influenced problem in Cameroon. Furthermore, the ambiguous use of terms in the relevant literature does not contribute to a clarification.
4 Analysis International Level:

4.1 Institutional Structures & Stakeholders influencing the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon

On international level water related issues get growing importance. The international community occupied itself with water from environmental as well as developmental perspective. Due to globalisation understanding the national state as the only legitimated stakeholder of drinking water management is obsolete (PARTZSCH 2007 cf. MATHEWS 1997, ROSENAU 1997). Increasingly, during the globalisation discourse of the 1990ties the state was successively giving power to international stakeholders resulting in a change of dependency relations and growing importance of transnational actors like the private sector and the civil community (PARTZSCH 2007).

To understand the international structures, which influence the DWG in Cameroon this chapter focuses on development cooperation and the engagement of securing the drinking water access from an international perspective.

4.2 Global Conventions & Aims

With the end of the 1970ties water resources in general and drinking water in particular reached growing attention on international floor. For the first time, at the UN Conference Mar del Plata in 1977 the access to water was asserted and the intention of an assessment about the use of water was considered. Resulting from the Mar del Plata Conference the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade from 1981 to 1990 was adopted by the United Nation Water Conference in 1977 (UNCED 1992; UNESCO 2006A; WHO 2010; UNW-DPAC 2011). But its objective of drinking water provision to underserved urban and rural areas till 1990 was not achieved (UNCED 1992). Progressively, the economic value of water got more enlightened and the role of the market as water supplier was officially recognized at the International Conference on Water and Environment (ICWE) in Dublin in 1992, which has shaped the international (drinking) water sector up to now (NADKARN 2005; BOUGUERRA 2006; PLATE 2008; BAKKER 2010; BECKEDORF 2010; BLANC & BOTTON 2010; DOBNER 2010). Four principles, named the Dublin
Principles (Table 4-1), were elaborated and made the passage to commercialization and commodification of service (BAKKER 2009; BLANC & BOTTON 2010) by declaring water as a technically delimited and economic good (PARTZSCH 2007; BLANC & BOTTON 2010). The Dublin Principles are described to determine a holistic approach, but are nevertheless critically discussed. At the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (UN Conference of Environment and Development (UNCED)) the four principles were taken up to the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Principles (Table 4-2). Beyond, in the there adopted Agenda 21, IWRM became an inherent part of international water policy to develop, manage and use water as scarce vulnerable resources (UNCED 1992). In Johannesburg in 2002 it was agreed that an IWRM Action Plan for each country has to be agreed in late 2005. GWP (2010) states this would be the major step in the direction of achieving the MDG 7 with target 10.

“IWRM is based on the perception of water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization” (UNCED 1992:197).

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<th>Table 4-1: Dublin Principles</th>
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1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment.
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels.
3. Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.

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<th>Table 4-2: IWRM Principles</th>
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<td>Source: GWP 2013.</td>
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1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment.
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels.
3. Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.
4. Water is a public good and has a social and economic value in all its competing uses.
5. Integrated water resources management is based on the equitable and efficient management and sustainable use of water.
In distinction to the Dublin Principles the social meaning of water is in the understanding of IWRM stronger addressed. UNCED (1992) underlines the importance for IWRM of full public participation including women, youth, indigenous people and local communities in water management policy-making and decision-making. The Agenda 21 also promotes the international engagement in drinking water supply.

Natural water resources and drinking water received further growing global attention as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which were adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in New York in 2000. While almost all of the eight MDGs can be indirectly linked to water supply, Goal seven addresses them directly by target ten: to “[…] halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water […]” (MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2006; WWC 2006). At the ensuing World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, the target ten was expanded and water became recognized as a critical factor to meet all MDGs (PARTZSCH 2007). The WHO (2008:1) says, meeting the target ten “[…] would deliver further development benefits and contribute to poverty reduction (target 1) and hunger reduction (target 2) through the use of water supply […]”. But almost oppositely SCHALATEK (2013) criticized the strong separation between the Goals and says that a sustainable development is not possible as long as goals like gender equality (MDG 3) and environmental sustainability (MDG 7) are this largely separated. Doubts about the MDGs are summarized by WWC (2006) and PARTZSCH (2007) as underestimation of global cost, high complexity, low acceptance for protection, and need for cross border management has been underestimated.

After Johannesburg further deliberations, conferences and summits have been conducted to advance collaboration and action in the field of fresh water. Inherent: (i) the period of “Water for Life” from 2005 - 2015 by resolution 58/217, (ii) the “Human Right to Water” by the resolution A/RES/64/292 in 2010, (iii) the International Year of Water Cooperation in 2013 or (iv) the currently consultation process to elaborate a post 2015 agenda (UNDESA 2013; UNW-DPAC 2013; JME 2013).
Nevertheless, water has not been explicitly accepted as a self-standing human right in international treaties, just more international laws entail obligations related to water access. The Human Right to Water does not mean drinking water should be free of charge, but it should be accessible and people should be able to pay for it. Thereby a national water policy and strategy plays an important role in ensuring government accountability. The state beside the growing influence of public-private actors has “[…] to ensure that any form of service provision guarantees equal access to affordable, sufficient, safe and acceptable water” (WHO 2010:35) (Box 3).

**Box. 3: What does sufficient, safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable access to water mean?**

Source: WHO 2010.

According to the WHO (2010) **sufficient** means that people have access to 50 – 100 l per day to ensure the most basic needs. The water should be **safe**, which means free from microorganisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards. **Acceptable** stands for water facilities and services, which are culturally appropriate and sensitive to gender, lifecycles and privacy requirements. **Under accessible** the WHO (2010) defends that the water source has to be within 1km of the home and the collection time should not exceed 30min. Water is defined by the Dubliner Principles as an economic good but it should be **affordable**. UNDP suggested that water costs should not exceed 3% of a household income.
Additionally, the term Water Governance entered into the standard international vocabulary over the past decades since a multitude of stakeholders besides governments became more prominent in managing drinking water, allocating resources and organizing service provision (UNESCO-IHE 2014). In the post-2015-process water remains an important aspect for poverty reduction, but undefined remains the “how” as of this writing (UN 2013; THE-WORLDWEWANT 2013).

4.3 Neoliberal Interests in Drinking Water Governance

The drinking water sector has been strongly shaped by the neoliberal considerations with the awaking of the monetarism (“money matters”) launched by the international community since the 1980s. Neoliberalism has become the ground for the implementation of international and national water policies and is carried out by privatization and decentralization reforms (SWYNGEDOUW 2005; CONCA 2006; BAKKER 2013; LIEB 2013). That case has also an impact on Cameroon.

BECKEDORF (2010) summarized neoliberalism as the promotion of market mechanism for all good and service allocations, and the limitation of the state based on the assumption that “less government is good government” in order to enhance efficiency and growth (MOORE 1986; PITELIS & CLARKE 1993; CASTREE 2008; LEITNER ET AL. 2007; WARD & ENGLAND 2007; KOLB 2008; ENGARTEN 2010 HERRISON 2010). The market value of public goods, such as water is emphasized (BECKEDORF 2010).

Especially, the international actors IMF and the World Bank have launched the neoliberalism process (WILLIAMSON 2000; RAUCH 2009; NUSCHLER 2009; BLANC & BOTTON 2010). But also the EU, AfDB, ADB, further bilateral development donors and transnational water corporations have invested in the privatization under the comprehension that institutional service is “[...] more efficiently provided by the private sector” (WORLD BANK 1989:8; BUD-DUS & McGranahan 2003; DECKWIRT 2004; BOURGUEREA 2006; PARTZSCH 2007; BAKKER 2013). Hereby the Washington Consensus was implemented (WINPENY 2003; BAKKER 2008; LIEB 2013; BOX 4). In contrast to industrialized countries, southern countries like Cameroon were obliged to apply for
Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP) in order to get credits of the international development banks (WORLD BANK 1989; TANGRI 1999; BUDDS & MCGRANAHAN 2003; LEE & MCBRIDE 2007; NUSCHLER 2009; BAKKER 2010; GTI 2013B; LIEB 2013). In 1988/89 the Cameroonian government was forced by the IMF and the World Bank to adapt the first of three SAPs (KONINGS 1999; CHIA & HUTTING 2010; EXP. 16, AUGUST 2013).

Box 4: Washington Consensus & SAP

The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in 1989. Its ten principles became rapidly generalized and are seen as a synonym for neoliberalism and globalisation with the message: „Liberalize as much as you can, privatize as fast as you can, and be tough in monetary and fiscal matters” (KLOOKO 1998; quoted by WILLIAMSON 1999). The World Bank and IMF assumed, that Sub-Sahara African countries could adapt to the conditions of the world market within 3 - 5 years by means of SAP (SIEBOLD & NUSCHLER 1996).

Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP) implemented in the Washington Consensus brought out changes in the commercial policy by globally standardized instruments without adopting them to local conditions (RAUCH 2009). The IWF implemented SAP through Policy Framework Papers (PFP) and the World Bank through Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) (WATKINS 1995; FEINBERG 1997). Both with the focus on: deregulation of economy and labour market, privatization and withdrawal of state (BAKKER 2013). The objective and the trickle-down were not achieved which was at the latest admitted by the implementation of Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA) (BPB 2005). The result of the SAP was an increased gap between a few winners and numerous losers caused by the reform dilemma and unadjusted implementation (UNICEF 1989; Ö, M2005A; RAUCH 2009).

4.3.1 Privatization

The privatization as part of the global neoliberal mainstream changed also the political-economical configuration in the drinking water sector since the 1990ties. It casts back the state in the managing of drinking water and new institutions had been negotiated (SWYNGEDOUW 2005; BAKKER 2013). Privatization is described by AGRAWAL (2000:54) as a “transfer of responsibility” and by BAKKER (2003b:7) as a “transfer of ownership” of water supply systems to private enterprises. SWYNGEDOUW (2005) adds, the externalization of command and control function reshapes the social power geometry between societies, businesses and government. Private actors became much more powerful in the strategic water-related decisions than civil societies. This leads to new governance structures characterized by a multitude of institution and stakeholder ar-
ticulation with varying degrees of power. In general it can be distinguished between proponents and opponents of water privatization (BAKKER 2010). For each position the reasons are summarized in Table 4-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for the endorsement of water privatization</th>
<th>Reasons for the critical appraisal of water privatization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Failure of state to deliver services</td>
<td>• Public water providers are not necessarily more efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved orientation towards the fresh water needs of consumer</td>
<td>• Private water supply companies: cherry-pick profitable areas where they benefit most; they fail to act in poor areas where households do not get access to water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved performance of water supplier</td>
<td>• Private water contractors are governmentally secured: the investment risk is taken by the public not private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facilitation of private capital and investments in water infrastructure</td>
<td>• Private supplier let water service deteriorate due to the primacy of profitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased connection rates to water supply networks</td>
<td>• Increasing water prices resulting in enhanced socio-economic inequality, public protest and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Particular benefit of poor water consumer (lower charge and better access)</td>
<td>• Increasing of bribery, corruption/under-the-table-deals and clientilism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Profit water pricing which stimulates awareness of water scarcity</td>
<td>• - It is a form of theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthening of community participation, entitlement and right enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-3: Pros and Cons of Water Privatization

Public-private-partnership: The most popular form of water privatization

According to BECKEDORF (2010) one of the most popular forms of water privatization is Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). It is characterized by outsourcing of water fee collection, network construction and well or treatment plant operation to the private sector (MUSA 2000; CASTRO 2008; SIKOR ET AL. 2008; BAKKER 2010; BECKEDORF 2010; JAGLIN & ZÉRAH 2010). The contract forms of PPP are many-faced and shortly listed in Table A 3. The French leasing-model is favoured by the World Bank (BECKEDORF 2010) and used in Cameroon. In the Global South the water privatization was facilitated by liberalization and “[...] pro-private-sector policies, technical assistance, and training programs of agencies and development banks (BAKKER 2013:254 CF. WORLD BANK 1997; BANERJEE ET AL. 2006; GOLDMAN 2007). GOLDMAN (2007) states a precondition for a “highly indebted or poor” country to borrow money from the World Bank or IMF is the implementation of a privatization policy.
Founded on the results and failures of the neoliberalism mainstream in the 1980ties SWYNGEDOUW (2005) and DOBNER (2010) argue that the state has to remain (or become again) the key player in organizing drinking water supply. Even the WORLD BANK (2005) admitted that the public sector effort is necessary to extend the supply.

4.3.2 Decentralization

Occasionally, privatization is characterized as a form of decentralization since both deal with the reduction of the central government. But beside both are closely linked to neoliberal policies, they prosecute a complete different logic (RAUCH 2009; BECKENDORF 2010). The neoliberal perspective considered administrative decentralization as a precondition for innovation, competition, administrative and financial efficiency and those for economic growth (RONDINELLI ET AL. 1989; VAUBLE 2001). In general, decentralization is defined as transfer of power, means, responsibilities and resources (RONDINELLI ET AL. 1989; RÜLAND 1993; AGRAWAL 2000; VAUBLE 2001; RAUCH 2009; BECKEDORF 2010). Decentralization reforms in the governance of water have influenced a vertical change of national, regional and local power (MIRUMACHI & VANWYK 2010 cf. LEMOS & AGRAWAL 2006; BIRKENHOLZ 2009). Broadly it can be distinguished based on their intensity and dimensions as summarized in Table 4-4.

In Cameroon decentralization is promoted by the recent and current national strategy papers (see chapter 5.1.2 and 5.2.3).

| Administrative & Political Decentralization | Fiscal & Market Decentralization/ Provision via Market rather via State |
| Deconcentration | Devolution | Delegation | Transfer |
| - Transfer of responsibilities to sub-level within the central governmental authorities. | - Devolution of responsibilities from the centre to the local unities. | - Delegation of responsibilities from the government to NGOs or other non- or semi-governmental actors. | - Transfer of responsibilities from the government to the private sector. |
| - Faintest form of decentralization. | - Most extensive form. | - Middle extensive | - Middle extensive |

Table 4-4: Four different Aspects of Decentralization

### 4.4 International Stakeholders in the Drinking Water Governance

Since the beginning of the 1980ties a water lobby composed of all levels with varying interests from improving access to equal drinking water supply right up to water as an economic commodity merge. UNDP (2013b) for instance classifies the stakeholders’ sector in public, private, civil and external ones and Goldman (2007) speaks directly about states, international financial institutions, development agencies, think tanks, firms and NGOs. The sub-chapter 4.4 simplifies and rather focuses on international civil organizations, donors and transnational water companies which become relevant in chapter 5.3 again.

#### Civil Society

The institutionalized water sector has brought up non-governmental actors as “new global players” resulting in an increased interpenetration of the local, regional, national and international policies (multi-level-approach) (NADKARNI 2005; PRATZSCH 2007). RUCHT (1997) argued the civil actors have been opposing of the economical globalization with an outstanding high number of northern and low number of southern civil actors (PARTZSCH 2007). Partzsch (2007) divides the civil society in the water sector into four categories with different positions to water prices and privatization as shown in Table 4-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Social Movement</th>
<th>Critical NGO</th>
<th>Constructive NGO</th>
<th>QUANGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Free Water”</td>
<td>Brot für die Welt</td>
<td>WaterAid</td>
<td>WWC</td>
<td>GWP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position: Water Price, Privatization</th>
<th>Social Movement</th>
<th>Critical NGO</th>
<th>Constructive NGO</th>
<th>QUANGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Against water prices and privatization</td>
<td>- Not principally against water prices</td>
<td>- Against water privatization</td>
<td>- Neither principally against water prices nor water privatization</td>
<td>- Pro water prices and privatization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4-5: Global Civil Society in the Drinking Water Sector**

Civil society organizations (CSO) in the Drinking Water Governance comprise a variety of institutions (UN-GLOBAL COMPACT 2013). Starting from the United Nations more than twenty institutions like UNEP, UNHabitat, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNWATER are dealing with water and beside inter-governmental partnerships the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) registered in 2004 40 multi-stakeholder (Typ-2) partnerships with water as a direct topic and 80 partnerships with water as a secondary topic (PRATZSCH 2007; BOX 5).

Box 5: TYP-1 & TYP-2 Partnership

At the WSSD in 2002, beside inter-governmental partnerships (Typ-1) also multi-stakeholder-partnerships (Typ-2) were accepted. Typ-2 partnerships stay for a free partnership between governments, international organizations and non-governmental actors of the private sector and the civil society (PARTZSCH 2007). They are considered as an important step in direction to privatization (BRÜHL ET AL. 2001). On the one hand they are believed to be a solution for the water problem on the other hand they are highly contested.

Transnational Water Companies (TWC)

In the Global South the water privatization has to be understood in the broader context of the “[...] water industry liberalization in Europe during the 1990s [...] , which enabled French, British and Spanish water companies to diversify activities internationally“ (BAKKER 2013:254 cf. ALLOUCHE&FINGER 2001; BAKKER 2004; PARTZSCH 2007). NADKARNI (2005) states wherever abundant water resources are pressed, the infrastructure, administration and management will be sold, which can be put on the level of water privatization. Thereby urban and suburban areas are more profitable for companies than rural areas (NADKARNI 2005; BAKKER 2013).

Private water companies establish a secure position on the international market since water became one of the most incentive markets for TWGs (GOLDMAN 2007). They work more profit- and growth-oriented than public enterprises. Based on structural conditions like capital, know-how and liberalization mainly western and northern TWC establish themselves in developing countries (PARTZSCH 2007). Due to UNESCO (2006B) the private sector kept under control 35 % of water supply and sanitation in the Global South and 80 % in
the Global North in 2006. Two French TWCs, Veolia and Suez are at the forefront of private water supplies followed by RWE, SAUR, Aguas de Barcelona and further new companies have been founded (Swynegedouw 2005; Nadkarni 2005; Pinsent Masons 2012).

The potential achievement of a win-win scenario of private profit and public benefit was predicted (Bakker 2013). But in the Global South the private water companies bear several risks. In particular: economic risk of long pay back periods, political risk as well as the difficulty of extending networks by high proportion of poor people with a low ability to pay (WHO 2008; Bakker 2013). Lately, in 2005 it became clear that the decreased aid funding was not replaced by private investment (Bakker 2013; cf. WDM 2005, 2006) and due to the World Bank (2005) a renewed public-sector effort was necessary to extend the provision of water supply to poor households (Bakker 2013; cf. World Bank 2003, 2005). At this time the concept of PPP raised (Partzsch 2007; Beckedorf 2010). If it is the right approach to solve the drinking water problem is still highly discussed (AWWF 2013; Bakker 2013).

**Donors**

The main donors for improved water provision are already mentioned above. They include among others the World Bank, IMF, KfW, EU, AfDB, ADB, bilateral development donors and transnational water corporations. In the late 1980ties and the 1990ties international donors forced under the Washington Census and SAP the privatization of the drinking water sector, which gradually passed into the mainstream of PPP with focus on the French leasing model. Currently major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid on the condition that good governance reforms are undertaken (Conzelmann 2003). Adam (2000) states the World Bank became more political, nevertheless the economical dimension of drinking water remains in the foreground (Nuschler 2009).

### 4.5 Critical Reflection

At least since the late 1970ties the attention of the protection, management as well as the supply of freshwater resources is rising in the international development cooperation. But the general objective to globally guaranteed drinking water supply is since then not achieved which has to be reflected in the histori-
cal efforts, given structures and involved actors including their capacities and interests.

The Dublin Principles with the focus on water as an economic good can be critically discussed. However one of the key messages of the Dublin Principles, New Delhi Conference as well as IWRM principles that women have a central role in the provision, management and safeguarding of water, are up to now not integrated in the MDGs because of the separated MDG3 and MDG7. Neither gender equality nor aspects of the human right to water are addressed in the MDG7. It is concluded one of the post-MDG challenges is to emerge a Goal concerning drinking water including the aspects of the human right to water.

The already critical approached international neoliberal mainstream supported by the Washington Census and implemented is SAP led to structural reforms, which aftermath are still influencing the structures in the Global South. The problem is that SAPs could be called a western project based on rational, uniform and non-adaptive decisions by relocating power to economical elites without enhancing development. The objected trickle-down of the neoliberal mainstream was failed but privatization as a feature of the development policy remains an on-going objective of global governance. Privatization is emphasized in the Paris Declaration as well as crucial for global governance adjustment politics as Poverty Reduction or Growth and Employment Strategy Policies and the post-2015 debate. Beside positive aspects of privatization preponderate the negative ones (Table 4-3). Deductive the strong interest of economic growth under the pretext to provide ‘water for all’ by ignoring the aspects of the Human Right to Water and the “cherry picking” by TWCs of the most profitable areas leads to a spatial variation of private investment and access to drinking water. It could be concluded after TRUELOVE (2011:143) “[…] social differences are (re)-produced in and through every-day water practice”.

A multitude of researchers outline, that the state should hold the responsibility as control organ and counterweight to the progressing privatisation. However, in practice it is likewise a question of political will, capacity and attraction. If those factors are not addressed in favour of drinking water supply even the
involvement of the state is not a grantee for securing the drinking water provision. This leads to the assumption that the starting point is good governance with clear role definition of stakeholders. In the sector of fresh water this implies if good drinking water governance is addressed, the potential to secure equal drinking water management and provision is rising.
5 Analysis National Level:

5.1 Conditions & Institutional Structures influencing the Drinking Water Governance from Outside the Drinking Water Sector in Cameroon

Cameroon, which is also named “Africa in miniature” is quite diverse in its traditional, cultural, historical, ecological and political circumstances as well as access possibilities to drinking water. It exhibits all major geographic features of the continent: mountains, desert, rain forest, savannah grassland, and ocean coastline. Cameroon belongs to the Central Africa region but is even often counted to West Africa. The French geographer Jean-Claude Bruneau states:

“Cameroon is the Africa of the jungle and that of the savannah; the Africa of the Moslems, Christians and Animists; French-speaking, English-speaking, yes, even Arabic-speaking Africa.” (BRUNEAU IN: RIEDEL 2013; PROJEKT DEUTSCHE SCHULE JAUNDE 2013)

By the reason that Drinking Water Governance is “[…] a part of broader social, ecological, political and economic developments and is thus also affected by decisions outside of the water sector” (UNDP 2013b), chapter 5.1 considers the general national environmental, political and socio-economical conditions to create an idea of Cameroon.

5.1.1 Ecological Conditions: Location, Climate and Fresh Water Resources in Cameroon

Cameroon covers an area of 475,000 km² (about one third bigger than Germany) (AFDB & OECD 2007; RIEDEL 2013) and is divided into ten regions, 58 departments and 361 districts and counts 230 different ethnical groups and languages (INS 2011a). It is well watered, with uneven distribution of rainfall from one part of the country to another (AFDB & OECD 2007; UNDP 2008; AKO ET AL. 2010).

The country is located on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea at 2° N and extends to the Lake Chad by latitude 13° N with a length of approx. 1200 km. Ordered from the longest to the smallest boarder, Cameroon has six neighbouring countries: Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (RIEDEL 2013).
Influenced by the geographical diversity, the temperature and precipitation is spatially highly fluctuating. GWP (2009B) as well as INS (2011A) fall back to the research of Suchels (1987) and Olivry (1986) and divide Cameroon into eight climate zones and six main watersheds as shown in the map below (Figure 5–1 & Figure A-2).
From the coastline to the north the amount of precipitation is generally decreasing while the temperature is inversely. The North of Cameroon at 6° N is semi-arid and the hottest and driest part of the country, experiencing an average temperature of 25 - 30° C. The temperature in the South is strongly varying with the altitude ranging 20 - 25° C (McSweeney et al. 2010).

The main wet season lasts between May and November but varies from South to the North (McSweeney et al. 2010). The wettest areas, like the locality De bundsha at the luv side of the Mt. Cameroon can receive up to 10000 mm of rainfall per year while the semi-arid Sahel (10° - 12° N) counts to the driest places with 700 mm per year (GWP 2009B).

Generally, Cameroon is the second country in Africa (after the Democratic Republic of Congo) in terms of quantity of available water resources estimated to 322 billion m³, out of it Mafany et al. (2006) supposed approx. 120 billion m³ are useable groundwater, spatial unevenly distributed (Mafany et al. 2006; AfDB & OECD 2007). This would result in an annually available water volume of 2100 m³ per inhabitant in Cameroon, which is three times higher than the world’s average (7000 m³). Beyond, Cameroon has a dense river network. Both, surface and groundwater resources are available but not spatial evenly distributed (Pangire Conference 26.04.2013). The experts at the Pangire Conference (26.04.2013) concluded that the following physical factors determine the fresh water resources: deforestation, climate change, sedimentation of riverbeds, physical and chemical contamination, eutrophication of rivers, parasites, floods and the following administrative factors as waste management, legal framework, multiplicity of interest groups and lack of coordination between different stakeholders. Especially the interview partners Exp. 1, 2, 8, 13, 15 and 16 (March – June 2013) indicated the inadequate management of the fresh water in Cameroon as a reason why water still remains as scarce resource.

Challenging is the low number of measuring instruments and their maintenance. Cameroon, by its geographical features quite diverse has only 27 pluvi-
ometer and 18 temperature stations are running (INS 2011A). Deductive the temperature and precipitation data is just a rough idea of the hydrological situation and fresh water quantity.

5.1.2 Political Conditions

Cameroon witnessed a long period of being pillaged by exploiting its people and resources through colonialism and slavery, which is still influencing the current political environment and action (HATTINGH 2009). From 1884 till 1919 Cameroon was considered as German Empire and since Germany was defeated in the First World War, France and Britain agreed under the Anglo-Franco-Declaration to divide the territory up into two parts of four-fifths controlled by France and one fifth in charge of Britain (EYONGETAH ET AL. 1987; NJOH 1999; DELANCEY ET AL. 2010; NJOH & FENDA 2011). Finally, after the independency of the French protected area in 1960 and the reunification of both sectors in 1961 the Federal Republic of Cameroon was born, which is named The Republic of Cameroon since 1984 (CAMEROON HIGH COMMISSION 2013). The separation has left two official languages and a high influence of French administrative values, ideologies and structures (OPEN DISCUSSION WITH EXP. 16; EMPLOYEES OF GIZ AND CITIZENS OF YAOUNDÉ BETWEEN MARCH AND JUNE 2013).

CHIA & HUTTING (2010) state that the formal independency brought just little relief: local elites still enrich themselves by collaborating with “new imperial powers”, the president has an infinity re-election right since 2008 (AUSWÄRTIGES AMT 2012), the county is highly corrupted and counts due to the HDI 2012 to the group of low human developed countries.

After independency and re-unification (1960/61) Cameroons governance aimed to harmonize and unify the western and eastern regions but finally cut out West-Cameroon (British Cameroon) by creating a francophone dominated state (KONINGS 1999). The essential West-Cameroon institutions were either eliminated or subsumed by East - Cameroon ones like the assimilation of the “Water Division of West Cameroon’s Public Works Department” to eastern public company SNEC (NJOH 1999; INS 2011A). This development is de-
scribed by NJOH (1999) as centralization of power after “western administration systems”.

The first Cameroonian president, Ahmadou Ahidjo ruled the repressive government for twenty years (NJOH 1999; BBC 2013). The interview partner Exp. 1 (23.03.2013) explained that Ahidjo came from the North of the country therefore the northern region became developed. Paul Biya, the former Prime Minister succeeded him in 1982 and remained in power since then. He is from the South of the country so “[…] all emphasis goes to the south now […]” (Exp. 1, 23.03.2013). Thereby Biya is described to have an excessive narrow focus on his ethnic community named Beti (MONGA 1992; OPEN DISCUSSION WITH PARTICIPANTS AT A VIDEO PRESENTATION CONCERNING WATER SENSITATION ORGINIZED BY DYNAMICE CITOYENNE ON 21.03.2013).

**Governmental Form**  
Paul Biya governs in a presidential system and defines the Policy of Nation (AUSWÄRTIGES AMT 2012; IFES 2013; PRC 2013). Konings (1999) states, Biya as well as Ahidjo preferred a unitary to a federal state. In the early 1990s Biya was forced by international pressure to accept political liberalization and the introduction of multi-party politics but since then (1992) BIYA’s party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), is continuously in power (Box 6). With the revision of the constitution in 2008 the president eliminated the presidential term limits and became re-elected for the sixth time in a row in 2011 (ASSE 1995; TAKOUGANG 1995; AUSWÄRTIGES AMT 2012; POLLMANN 2013; Exp. 16 March – June & August 2013).

**Box 6: Legislative Elections in Cameroon**  
The parliamentary elections take place every five years by direct ballot of the National Assembly (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013) lastly at 23rd September 2013 accompanied by vote rigging (WIEDEMANN 2008; AED 2012; POLLMANN 2013). Of the close to 300 named parties the CPDM got 148 seats and the other 32 seats were distributed to the parties listed in Table 5-1 (AED 2012; MULANGO 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>CPDM</th>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>UDC</th>
<th>UPC</th>
<th>MDR</th>
<th>MRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5-1: Legislative Election Results from 23rd September 2013**  
(SDF=Social Democratic Front; UNDP=National Union for Democracy and Progress; UDC=Union for Democracy and Change; UPC=Union of the Populations of Cameroon; MDR=Movement for the Defense of the Republic; MRC=Renaissance Movement)
Since the launch of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2003, Cameroon emphasizes on decentralization (IMF 2003; MBUAGBO & FRU 2011; PNDP 2011). Alike, the current GESP (2010 - 2020) promotes the decentralization process through the introduction of the councils and regional development plans (REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 2009). According to the decentralization law (762/PJL/AN 2004) and accented by the president in 2011 the decentralization process by the transfer of power and establishment of the regional councils is on-going. AKO AKO ET AL. (2009) explain the councils have the institutional capacity and responsibility of basic service provision to communities, including the supply and management of water resources. But as the current constitution from 2008 (Figure 5–2) shows the decentralization of power on the governmental level is low. Solely the president defines the national policy, which is the matrix for clientilism and corruption. The decentralization process is lacking behind the target, which hinders a clear redistribution of stakeholder roles (AMCOW 2010). Beside the existence of the National Participative Development Program (PNDP), which promotes decentralization, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD) and the decentralization laws, the decentralization process in Cameroon remains still in its early stages and the role of regional councils and communities is more or less theoretical (AMCOW 2010). The decentralization process is not accompanied by financial resource allocation to local communities. Furthermore the lack of access to information limits the participation of communities (AKO AKO ET AL. 2009). The World Bank (2011:5) states that the legal framework pertaining decentralization “is overlapping, cumbersome and contradictory, and in many respects open to different interpretations”. Decrees concerning decentralization are listed by INS (2011A) and the WORLD BANK (2011). Beside decentralization, Cameroon is also on the way to privatization, from which mainly international enterprises take profit (AfDB 2009; RIEDEL 2013). The privatization process in the Drinking Water Governance is presented in more detail in chapter 5.2.1.
The president is ranked as one of the most entrenched leaders in Africa (BBC 2013) and in 1998 Cameroon was classed as the most corrupted country in the world (rang 85 out of 85 countries) and is still corrupt despite the improvement to position 144 out of 174 countries in the Transparency Index 2012 (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 1998, 2012; AfDB 2009; FOMINYEN 2011).

The Cameroonian filmmaker Jean-Pierre Bekolo mentioned in an interview that after 52 years of independency Cameroon is still unable to reach its aims and a democratically change (LEPENIES 2013). WIEDEMANN (2009) goes further and expresses that the president created with bribe, repression and vote rigging an awkward attackable power system and corruption is fostered by a lacking political democracy, accountability and the cultural erosion of traditional values (Box 7).
In order to manage Cameroon’s development, several master plans were carried out. After its independency (1961) Cameroon had six five-year master plans followed after the end of the Cold War by three structural adjustment plans (SAP I-III) under the “monetary management of the World Bank” (EXP. 16 AUGUST 2013; WORLD BANK 1989). That resulted in poverty nevertheless high international acceptance (EXP. 1, 23.03.2013). Currently Cameroon’s development base on the “Vision 2035”, which is specified by a Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) 2010-2020 supported by the World Bank and IMF (GWP 2009B; IMF 2010; WORLD BANK 2010, 2013C).

### 5.1.3 Socio-Economical Conditions

#### Social Development

Since 1982 the Cameroonian population doubled and is estimated at about 21,69 million citizens in 2012 with an estimated growth rate of 2,6 % per year and progressing urbanization. Of those about 51 % of the population are living in cities (BUCREP 2010; INS 2011A; UNDP 2013A; WORLD BANK 2013). The rapid urbanization and population growth call for investments in basic urban services, such as transport, health, education, electricity and water but like EXP. 8 (21.05.2013) states “the last 20 years the government was sleeping” and did not invest in the management or maintenance of social services (EXP. 1, 23.03.2013; EXP. 8, 21.05.2013; AMCOW 2010; WORLD BANK 2010). Of the
300 urban areas with more than 5000 inhabitants, only 98 have water supply networks (AKO ET AL. 2009). This underinvestment in infrastructure is a “[...] bottleneck for competitiveness and growth” (WORLD BANK 2010:10).

The youth under the age of 25 makes the majority of the population with 64,3 %, while only 5 % are older than 60 (INS 2011A). Especially the young population faces the problem of lack of future perspectives and unemployment. Even with an academic degree the majority is employed in the informal sector (WIEDEMANN 2009; INS 2011A). Working in one of the traditional restaurants or bars in Cameroon brings out a salary of approx. 28000FCFA per month (approx. 42,70 €) (OPEN DISCUSSION WITH CITIZENS OF YAOUNDÉ MARCH – JUNE 2013). All in all 39,9 % of the population in 2007 earned less than 28440 CFA per month (approx. 43,40 €) and can therefore be considered as poor (55 % in the rural and 12,2 % in the urban area) (INS 2011A).

Cameroon is ranking the Gender Inequality Index 137 out of 148 countries. Only 21,1 % of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 34,9 % of their male counterparts. In parliament only 13 % of the seats are held by women (UNDP 2013A). Inequality is also reflected in the access to water. EXP. 1 (23.03.2013) explains, “The access to water in Cameroon is not equal. Mainly women and children suffer from the water problem. In case no water is available they are responsible to collect drinking water. Further, the level of water supply varied between the city districts. Some districts do not have water for three days, other areas like Nkoldongo do not have water for more than two years“. For instance institutions like the Youth Council are composed by people who are already employed by the ministries, this is low concerned with women or children empowerment (EXP. 1 23.05.2013, EXP. 2, 25.03.2013). Thereby the traditional values and hierarchical structures characterize the social life at all levels like EXP. 2 (25.03.2013) describes “children in Cameroon are like their fathers: They do not want to change, they do not want to think”. Another relevant aspect are good connections to get e.g. a higher degree or mark in the education environment, to get a better position at work or to bribe the police at the road (OBSERVATION MARCH – JUNE 2013).

**Economic Aspects**
The economical situation seems to be a bit paradox. That is also expressed by the WORLD BANK (2010). Besides drinking water resources, Cameroon in general is rich on natural resources and the geographical position as an transit zone. Unfortunately Cameroon “does not transform this into sustainable economic growth or poverty reduction” (WORLD BANK 2010; AfDB 2009; IMF 2013). Nevertheless, Cameroon has maintained macro-economic growth in the recent years but the performance to improve social-economic indicators has been insufficient. The real GDP per capita has stagnated for several years and the poverty rates have stagnated at close to 40 % (INS 2011; IMF 2012, 2013). Alike most Sub-Sahara-African countries, Cameroon is an agricultural country. The majority of the people is working in agriculture, livestock production and forestry sector (INS 2010C, RIEDEL 2013). All in all 63,5 % of the working population is employed in informal agriculture, 28,51 % in informal non-agriculture, 3,8 % in the public and 4,2 % in the private sector (Figure 5–3) (INS 2011A). Agriculture is therefore of particular socio-economic importance and demands the highest amount of water. Another high volume of water goes to electricity. 77% of electricity is out of hydro capacity (WORLD BANK 2010).

The economical potential is fostered by poor infrastructure, management and limited value adding activities as well as land grabbing of international and national actors (IFPRI 2009; WORLD BANK 2010; SÜDWIND FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT 2011; LAND MATRIX 2013; RIEDEL 2013).

![Figure 5–3: Poverty Rate 2001 & 2007; Mode of Employment](Source: INS 2011A.)
Cameroon faced several economic crises like the one of 1986 - 1994 or 2007/2008 and the business climate is insufficient difficult political circumstances, missing infrastructure, administrative barriers, slowness, paying taxes/tax dodging right up to corruption (AFDB & OEXD 2007; GWP 2009c, AUSWÄRTIGES AMT 2012; RIEDEL 2013; WORLD BANK 2010; 2013b). Further economic key data is listed in (Table 5-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Cameroon 2012</th>
<th>Matched data Germany 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (growth %)</td>
<td>4.7¹</td>
<td>0.7¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita [US$]</td>
<td>1151⁴</td>
<td>41514⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP current US$ [billion]</td>
<td>24,98³</td>
<td>3,399,6³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing Business Ranking (2013) [rank out of 189 countries]</td>
<td>168⁵</td>
<td>21⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment in the age of 15 and older [% 2011]</td>
<td>Visible unemployment 14.8¹, ² (people who involuntarily work less than 40h/week)</td>
<td>Invisible unemployment: 63.7² (salary less than 28500CFA/month for 40h/week)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-3: Economical Basic Information
Source: ¹INS 2010A; ²INS 2011B, ³AEO 2013; ⁴WORLD BANK 2013; ⁵WORLD BANK 2013b; ⁶GERMAN TRADE & INVESTMENT 2013b.

5.1.4 Critical Reflection
The various socio-cultural, historical, ecological and political circumstances as well as access possibilities to drinking water and a high urbanization rate call for an adaptive governance on a multidimensional level but the potential and diversity of Cameroon is not addressed in a sustainable and equal manner. From the period of colonization, followed by a centralistic conducted government of only two presidents during five decades and, international non adaptive cooperation suppressed this diversity with personal power interests and advantages.

The engagement of the international cooperation to foster privatization and decentralization was not adapted to the national context. It is more resulting in profit keeping for a small number of people and international companies, which is reflected in general in low economic growth, constant poverty and an
invisible unemployment rate as well as a weak improvement in the access to drinking water. As RAUCH (2009) states, decentralization and multiparty-systems are just a new packing of old structures. To really foster decentralization, the legal framework has to be cleaned up to remove contradictions and address sub-national accountability. Still, the investment in infrastructural development is lacking behind the population growth and urbanization rate. Reasons are the general slow administrative communication, the inefficiency of action, poor availability of data, hierarchical and cliantilistical structures as well as traditional values in all aspects of life, which suppress the action ability. This does not lead to a loss of importance of tradition and culture, but it calls for an openness to encounter corruption. Finally, a big structural constraint is demonstrated on the one hand that the Cameroonian society, especially the youth, are influenced by global ideas and the wish to change. But on the other hand they are not brought up to think autonomously. Summarized, it can be assumed, that the youth needs to get a voice to represent new thought inputs adapted to the Cameroonian context, which still remains a challenge for generations.
5.2   **Institutional Structures influencing the Drinking Water Governance from Inside the Drinking Water Sector in Cameroon**

The access to water is a motor for socio-economic development as the president of GWP-Central-Africa (EXP. 13, 28.05.2013) states: “Development goes with water management”. But a proper management is rarely present in the rural as well as urban areas in Cameroon (EXP. 13, 28.05.2013). Determined by the information source the number of people with access to drinking water varies between 42% and 74% of the population. The thesis refers to the information of GWP (2010) stating that 45.3% of the Cameroonianians have access to drinking water (58% of it in urban & 23% in rural areas). The capital for instance has a demand of 350000 m³ water a day but till June 2013 the private water company was only able to provide 100,000 m³ a day (EXP. 14, 03.06.2013). The World Bank expressed that the access to drinking water is still declining while the poverty is increasing (WORLD BANK 2011). The rising demand of safe drinking water entailed huge challenges for the Cameroonian society.

5.2.1   **Privatization and Decentralization in the Drinking Water Governance**

In Cameroon with Law No. 98/ 005 the government has stated in 1998 that water is a national heritage, which the state has to protect and manage to ensure all citizens the access to drinking water. At the same time several rules were implemented to start the privatization of the old state-owned water company SNEC, which was fostered by a series of three SAPs. The first attempt of privatization in 1999, with Suez as private investor was declared as unsuccessful in 2003. Finally with the Decree No 2005/493 and 2005/494 of 30th December 2005 the new institutional framework was laid down and the privatization was finalized in favour of a PPP (CAMWATER 2007). SNEC was restructured resulting in the creation of the public water company CamWater in 2005 (Decree No. 2005/493 & 2005/ 494, 2005) and the private one Camerounais des Eaux (CDE) in 2007 covered by its leas contract. Since 2008 CDE has been active for a period of ten years (AMCOW 2010; CDE 2012). The decen-
nalization should also affect the Drinking Water Governance but as expressed in chapter 5.1.2 the process is general low on national level.

5.2.2 Policies and Water Legislation

Beside the dense but unstructured legal frame, the Cameroonian water policy faces the problem of missing or ageing structures and strategies to manage and supply drinking water in a sustainable and sufficient manner. According to several experts Cameroon does not have a national water policy (GWP 2009D, 2010; CONFERENCE PANGIRE 2013; EXP. 11, EXP. 15, 04. & 05.06.2013), which is not confirmed by all stakeholders in the Cameroonian water sector (AFDB & OECD 2007; WHO 2012; EXP. 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 16) who appeal to several reforms. Especially the AfDB & CECD (2007) bear on principles of an alleged national policy. The GWP-CAM president states, “[…] a national water policy exists but it is different in each sector. A formal water policy does not exist” (EXP. 13, 28.05.2013). For the head of service of MINEE it is clear, a national water policy does not exist (EXP. 15, 05.06.2013). Experts almost agree about the existence of a water strategy, the understanding of it varies from SNEC privatization (EXP. 08 & 12, MAY 2013) to Cameroon paves the way for IWRM strategy (EXP. 16 AUGUST 2013). This shows already an inconsistent understanding of the water management without clear stakeholder responsibility allocation. All key dates in the DWG reformation are summarized in Table A-.

Nevertheless, through international pressure, the government implemented several reforms, sectorial plans and management instruments that bring out improved governance, decentralization, and institutional development (AFD 2009; AKO AKO ET AL. 2009; AMCOW 2010; GWP 2010; GTI 2013A). Inherent: the “Water Supply and Sanitation Policy for Rural Areas (PAEPAR)”, the “Water Sector Policy Letter for Urban Areas (LPSHU)” and the objective of safe and improved drinking water access as a component of the Vision 2035 (chapter 5.2.3).

The core stones to the current water legislations are the law on environment in 1996 and the one on water in 1998. The water law 98/005 intended to complete the environmental law and expresses the state has to secure the protec-
tion of water and facilitating alternative water supply to all in case of missing public water supply. Consequently it could be understood that the right to drinking water access is applied in the constitution. These laws adhere to the first principle of Dublin and IWRM that water is a finite and vulnerable resource, which has to be protected. Furthermore the laws call for decentralization of a part of the management to local entities and participatory approaches. However the participatory role of the community appears to be limited due to the lack of information access and the willingness to accept active participation (JME 22.03.2013). The intention of the Dublin as well as IWRM Principles to single out women as a central player in the managing of water is not addressed in the legislation; even if it exists, “nothing will be done to pinpoint women” (EXP. 2, 25.03.2013). Finally the economic value of water is recognized but not clearly appointed. AKO AKO ET AL. (2009) summarized the consumer price based on the abstraction, treat and transfer costs.

5.2.3 **Vision 2035, PRSP and GESP**
Cameroons development base on the “Vision 2035” document which is inspired by the Dublin Principles, Rio-Declaration 1992 and MDGs. The vision aspires Cameroon to become “[...] an emerging, democratic and united country in its diversity” by 2035 (REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 2009:7) and among the others establish an universal access to clean drinking water till 2035. The vision served as a basis for the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP), which replaces the PRSP (2003-2009) and reaffirms the resolve of the government to continue striving towards achieving all MDGs. The strategy paper is operational for all sectors also the water sector with its involved ministries (Figure 5–4). The exposition of the strategy varies by the sector and ministry; a clear understanding of it does not exist (EXP. 13, 28.05.2013). The efficacy of the GESP is abstracted by the disconnection of sectors and lacking transparency among political actors (GWP 2009C, D; REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 2009; AfDB 2010; AMCOW 2010; GWP 2010; RIEDEL 2013; COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION 2013; GIZ 2013). A more detailed look into the Vision and both strategies is given in Table 5-4.
Both strategies (GESP & PRSP) intend among the others to enhance the provision of drinking water on base of the MDG 7 (Table 5-4). The forecast of achieving this target differs by several sources. Whereas some of the stakeholders as INS and the WORLD BANK (2010) state that already 74 % of the Cameroonianians have access to drinking water and the Goal 7 is the only achievable, others as the COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION (2013) value the Goal 7 as unlikely to become achieved. Finally eight experts are unconvinced (EXP. 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, MARCH – JUNE 2013) about the strategy objective that “75 % of the population will have access to safe drinking water till 2020”. To the mentioned reasons count among the others that the target is just a “step into the World Bank” (EXP. 1, 23.03.2013), the “government has no focus on this aim. Their property is […] showing up for the international community” (EXP. 2, 25.03.2013), they are “[…] mainly dealing in the major cities”, “the mismanagement is a real problem” and it would at least take “a minimum duration of 100 years”.

Figure 5–4: GESP as National Master Plan for all Sectors, including Water Sector
### Vision 2035, PRSP 2003-2010, GESP 2010-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision 2035</th>
<th>PRSP 2003-2010</th>
<th>GESP 2010-2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>First strategy paper</td>
<td>Second strategy paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Long-term planning document</td>
<td>• Based on the MDG7: Reduction by half of the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water</td>
<td>• Anchored in Vision 2035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cameroon will become an “emerging nation, democratic and united in its diversity” by 2035</td>
<td>• 75% of the population will have access to safe drinking water till 2020</td>
<td>• Based on the MDG7: Reduction by half of the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extension of portable water provision to all Cameroonianians, especially in the rural area.</td>
<td>• 75% of the population will have access to safe drinking water till 2020</td>
<td>• 75% of the population will have access to safe drinking water till 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Implementing of drinking water production &amp; distribution systems in 113 semi-urban centres</th>
<th>Rehabilitation of infrastructure after 20 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Augmentation of the rate to portable water from 50% to 70%</td>
<td>• Developing a drinking water supply program targeting schools &amp; health centres across the country</td>
<td>• Extension of water networks which have lacked behind urbanization and population growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Huge investment in water infrastructure (Amount is not mentioned)</td>
<td>• Realization of large-scale connection programme</td>
<td>• Realization of large-scale connection programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improvement of quality, storage and treatment capacities</td>
<td>• Water as a topic in school</td>
<td>• Water as a topic in school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Realization of water supply network along with boreholes and wells (high priority. Number is not mentioned)</td>
<td>• Increasing water quality</td>
<td>• Increasing water quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Long term improvement</td>
<td>• Improvement of storage &amp; processing capacities</td>
<td>• Improvement of storage &amp; processing capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Involvement of all stakeholders</td>
<td>• Safe supply systems</td>
<td>• Safe supply systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide of pipe water systems; wells &amp; boreholes are supplement</td>
<td>• 700000 connections in urban areas; 40000 equivalent water points in rural areas; 1200000 latrines; rehabilitation of 6000 water points in the rural area</td>
<td>• 700000 connections in urban areas; 40000 equivalent water points in rural areas; 1200000 latrines; rehabilitation of 6000 water points in the rural area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 5-4: Vision 2035 and National Strategies concerning Drinking Water in Cameroon


### 5.2.4 IWRM Process

The problem of a missing formal water policy document is addressed with the purpose of an IWRM Action Plan for Cameroon, which due to GWP (2010) previewed the preparation of a policy paper. The government of Cameroon, together with five other African countries (Eritrea, Mozambique, Swaziland, Benin and Cape Verde) requested GWP to submit proposals to the Dutch Ini-
tiative for better water governance in their respective countries. Started by the Dutch Initiative, Cameroon committed itself to the elaboration of such a plan as base for a national water policy (GWP 2010). After the Orientation Document was validated, MINEE and GWP signed a Memorandum of Understanding, defining the collaboration between the GWP network and the government. The PAWD-II (second phase of the Partnership for Africa’s Water Development Program) through the Dutch Initiative seeks to provide financial assistance in preparing their National Integrated Water Resources Management Action Plans (Fr. = PANGIRE). In 2005, GWP-Cameroon (GWP-Cmr) was created, charged with facilitating the IWRM planning process, ensuring coordinated participation of water stakeholders and managing the programme funds (GWP 2010). The GWP-Cmr is based in Bastos, a neighbourhood of Yaoundé, and coordinates the GWP network and monitoring. In 2007 the government accepted and committed the IWRM approach by including the process in the public budget of MINEE. In the same year an IWRM management organ was created located in MINEE (Direction Water Supply and Hydrology). The IWRM plan is divided in 13 steps but Cameroon is lagging much behind the time plan (GWP 2010; Exp. 13, 28.05.2013; Exp. 15, 05.06; PANGIRE 26.04.2013). In 2013 a PAGIRE conference was held in Yaoundé with the objective to adapt the report of GWP published in 2009, which is condition for the implementation of a national IWRM policy. This already shows the slowness of the water sector.

IWRM is neither in the Vision 2035 nor in the PRSP or GESP clearly mentioned. In sum the following inhibiting factors of an IWRM Plan implementation have been gathered at the PANFIRE – Conference (16.04.2013): (i) missing national water policy combined with a huge number of scattered documents without continuity, (ii) lack of the water topic as strategic sector in the national master plan, (iii) poor national data basis (about the availability of water resources, needs, etc.), (iv) inadequate legal framework (mainly concerning watersheds, irrigation and protection), (v) inadequate institutional framework, (vi) weak human capacities (including the stakeholders in the water sector and in the IWRM planning process, experts only involved half-time, lack of stakeholder harmonization), and (vii) lack of financial support.
5.2.5 International Agreements


Furthermore the Cameroonian government singed the strategy papers between Cameroon and international financial cooperation partners (chapter 5.3.2)

5.2.6 Rural and Urban Water Supply Strategy

**Urban drinking water**

The water distribution in Cameroon is distinguished in the rural and urban water supply (Table 5-5; REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 2009; AMCOW 2010). In urban areas the access to drinking water was declining during the last two decades while the water governance was not really efficient and active (WORLD BANK 2011; EXP. 8, 21.05.2013; OPEN DISCUSSION WITH CITIZEN OF YAOUNDE). Contrasting, other statistics as from INS speak about an increasing access to drinking water. In the urban und sub-urban areas the public company CamWater and the private CDE are the only drinking water provision stakeholders (AMCOW 2010; GTI 2013A; CDE 2013). In 2007 the prime minister signed the “National Action Plan for the Water Supply and Sanitation Program in Urban Areas” (LPSHU) to enhance the provision of drinking water in urban and suburban areas (GWP 2009d; GWP 2010). According to AMCOW (2010), in case the current trend continues, 70,2 million € per year will have been allocated to the urban water supply sector between 2009 - 2015. Out of them 70 % will come from development partners.

**Rural drinking water**

The Action Plan for the Water Supply and Sanitation Program in Rural Areas (PAEPAR) was validated in 2007 to optimize and clear the role of the stakeholders (GWP 2009b; AMCOW 2012). Beside the decentralization process, the power allocation as well as money transfer to councils is more theoretical. The private sector is not active in the rural areas and AMCOW (2010) also states there are solely few NGOs active in the rural water supply sector. By now, only one large project called “Water is Life” was undertaken in 2009 – 2010 based in the NGO OTÉLÉ. Both strategies are summarized in Table 5-5.
5.2.7 Critical Reflection

Coupled with international engagement, the Cameroonian government shows interest in political reforms like privatization, decentralization as well as in the development of a national IWRM plan. However, the process of decentralization and the elaboration of a national water policy show the political willingness, capacity as well as clear distribution of stakeholder remit is incisive. The financial transfer to regional councils and communities is not functioning, which makes decentralised stakeholders incapable to use governmental financial resources. For the mentioned processes, the international investment is a main resource. Consequently, investment partners have a huge voice, whereas the civil society neither by law nor in practice is effectively involved and accepted as a free codetermination organ. Regarding to a successful implementation of an IWRM national water policy, Cameroon would need to renew the justice framework of water policy, the institutional body including stakeholder accountability, scope of action and capacities.

From open discussions, observations and literature research, it could not have been approved that any of the PRSP or GESP targets have been implemented. It is not assumed that action in this context is ambitious. The rural and urban strategy papers are seemed to be unsubstantial and no stakeholder will take account for it.
5.3 Stakeholders in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon

The central stakeholder role in the current institutional water framework in Cameroon is shaped by MINEE, the ministry for water and energy. Thus the decentralization process (Law No. 762/PJL/AN 2004) as well as the privatization policy has particular impact on the governance of water management in Cameroon. In total three main groups of stakeholders compose the institutional water sector framework on national level (Exp. 10, 13.05.2013; CDE 2013). The Figure 5–5 is composed by this stakeholders and furthers are added resulting from information of this chapter 5.3:

(i) The state represented mainly by MINEE and additional ministries,
(ii) The public-private sector represented by CamWater and CDE
(iii) The financial and technical cooperation partners.

The above-mentioned stakeholders do not include the civil society and NGOs as relevant stakeholders because its active participation power is low. Chapter 5.3.3 explains that civil society count as important stakeholder, especially in the rural area the government and private water companies are not represented (Exp. 1, 23.03.2013; Exp. 2, 25.03.2013; Exp. 10, 28.05.2013; Exp. 13, 05.06.2013; OBSERVATION AND OPEN DISCUSSION MARCH – JUNE 2013)
5.3.1 The Big Three: State, Public and Private Water Companies

PARTZSCH (2007) states, beside a global on-going privatization in the drinking water sector including growing non-national involvement, the government remains the representative of action. In Cameroon MINEE, being the deputy of the government is the central actor (EXP. 05, 06, 15 March - June 2013). But accounted by the transversal nature of water and unclear allocation of action plenty more public institutions intervene in this sector (AKO AKO ET AL. 2009; GWP 2009D, 2010; PANGIRE – CONFERENCE 16.04.2013; EXP. 8, 21.05.2013)

This huge number and interpenetrations of acting ministries (Table 5-6) without clear responsibility determination in the field of drinking water management result in high administrative effort and slowed capacity (EXP. 8, 21.05.2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public actor for water policy definition</td>
<td>MINEE, MINEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public operator</td>
<td>MINEE, MINHDU, MINARD, MINEPIA, MINATD,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance actor</td>
<td>MINFI, MINEE, MINEPAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public research actor</td>
<td>MINREX, MINATD, MINSAN, MINRESI, MINCOMMERCE, MINIMIDT,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-6: Ministries involved in the Water Sector in Cameroon

Source: Ott 2013 after GWP 2009D.

5.3.1.1 MINEE

However, the central office in the water sector is hold by MINEE through its directorate of Water Supply and Hydrology, for the urban as well as rural areas (AMCOW 2012). Summarized after AKO AKO ET AL. (2009) and GWP (2009D) MINEE is responsible for:
• Definition, application and evaluation of water policies in the field of water production, transport and distribution
• Coordination of tasks of stakeholders concerning water
• Execution of projects on managing water pollution, sanitation and water supply
• Addressing the topic of abstraction and discharge licences.

The government owns the water supply system and CamWater is responsible for its management (Exp. 09, 04.06.2013). MINEE's scope of action is mainly on the household level and less involved in the water sector of the industrial level (GWP 2009D).

The water department of MINEE is composed by its minister, two technical consultants, a central administration (34 employees) and a decentral service with an office in each of the ten regions (90 employees) (Exp. 04, 07.05.2013). According to the head of service of MINEE (05.06.2013) the recent statistic concerning the employees of the ministry is presented by GWP (2009D). It shows that 95% of the employees are at the age of 44 to 55, the technical human capacities are insufficient and not one woman apart from the office assistances is engaged in the ministry (PANGIRE CONFERENCE 26.04.2013; OWN OBSERVATION MARCH – JUNE 2013).

The central administration is subdivided as shown in Figure 5–6. Finally two departments (red circle in Figure 5–6), above all the Department of Water Supply and Hydrology is responsible for the water governance in Cameroon (GWP 2009D).
All ministers in Cameroon become normally nominated every 1.5 year by the government. But the current minister of MINEE, Dr. Basile Atangana Kouna came to power already in December 2011 (Exp. 4, 07.05.2013; MINEE 2014). He is the previous director of CamWater and described as administrator with weak understanding of technical aspects (Exp. 8, 21.05.2013). The president of the GWP-Central-Africa declares: “The Minister comes with a big suit and the name of the ministry, that’s all” (Exp. 13, 28.05.2013). In case to develop and implement a national-water-strategy e.g. an IWRM-plan of which “MINEE is the owner” (Exp. 15, 05.06.2013), Exp. 13 (28.05.2013) clarified, the frequent replacement of new ministers is an inhabiting factor.

“The family relations in the Ministry are quite strong. A non-written rule, which occurs mainly after the independency, is that each new Minister will employ new staff. For instance, the secretary is always a member of the family like the own sister or brother“ (Exp. 1, 23.03.2013).

Because the process is on-going since 2005, six different ministers have conducted MINEE, which slows down the process by repeating intentions and confidence building (Exp. 13, 28.05.2013). The World Bank, AMCOW, AFD

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**Box 8: The Political Willingness in Cameroon**

The international year of water cooperation 2013 was a topic for the International Water Day conference at the 22th March 2013 in Cameroon. Under the motto: “Together for an integrated and sustainable management of water resources” experts from NGOs, ministries, national organisations and journalists discussed the problem of access to drinking water in Cameroon.

Beside a delayed beginning of four hours and the non-attendance of relevant MINEE staff, the public bathroom of MINEE was under water due to a broken tap for several weeks. The reaction of an employee of MINEE: “You cannot wash your hands, it is broken.” It was not repaired.
and GIZ are the main donors for the water ministry (EXP. 15, 05.06.2013). MINEE record an improvement in its project planning. Since January 2013 the budget for the projects is not anymore restricted by a period of one year but rather adopted to the project management circle (EXP. 1, 23.05.2013; EXP. 15, 05.06.2013).

Beside its central role MINEE is criticized by experts and the literature for its weak capacities (GWP 2009A, D; AMCOW 2010; GWP 2010; CONFERENCE JME – CONFERENCE 22.03.2013; EXP. 8, 11, 15 MARCH – JUNE 2013). To the weaknesses count:

- Financial framework: The drinking water sector alike the sanitation sector does not have an appropriate budget management tool yet. The budget preparation remains highly centralized at MINFI level but MINEPAT and MINEE are involved as well. This means all sector ministries, like MINEE have little opportunities to translate their strategy into budget lines. There is a discrepancy between budget and project cycle. Furthermore, the budget for project monitoring, research management and monitoring of water resources is not enough.
- High administrational effort - slowly, inflexible and inefficient: Dominated by a high number of written reports.
- Decreasing quality and quantity of human resources: Men dominated ageing stuff and missing recruiting of young well-educated employees.
- Unclear responsibility allocation: Back and forth of administration and research institutions. MINEE’s responsibilities are highly fragmented and MINEE does not track its second task (coordination of stakeholder task)
- Weak decentralization: Insufficient coordination information and financial exchange between the national and regional level.

Despite MINEE is criticised by its slowness, inefficacy and qualitatively and quantitatively weak technical skills, it is an appreciated employer for all interviewed employees, which can fall back on family relations in further governmental institutions (EXP. 04, 07.05.2013; EXP. 15, 05.06.2013).
“The government is a comfortable employer. You do not have to work a lot. In the
classical sector you cannot make mistakes, other than in the government. The gov-
ernment will never dismiss you.” (EXP. 4, 07.05.2013)

To counteract the lacking coordination between institutions and ministries the
SNEC privatization was accomplished and the National Water Committee
(NWC) was founded by the Decree 2001/161 (in 2001). The mission of the
Committee is (i) to control the sector and activities, (ii) to accomplish research
studies in this field and (iii) to advice the government to develop a national sus-
tainable water management. To achieve the operation a bank account was es-
tablished. But till now neither the bank account nor the National Water Com-
mittee is active (GWP 2009D; EXP. 16 AUGUST 2013).

The National Water Committee “[…] is nonsense. They are composed of emplo-
yees who are already working in the water sector for instance in MIN EE and do not
have time. They meet only twice a year. It is not a permanent system. They are
meeting only twice a year because the members belong to many ministries. If you
want to change something, you need a concrete organization - members who like
to participate. If they are busy, they have no time to work in the NWC.” (EXP. 16,
AUGUST 2013)

Box 9: Capacity of the former company SNEC
Source: CAMWATER 2007; WORLD BANK 2013A; EXP. 12, 13, 28.05.2013.
SNEC (Société Nationale des Eaux du Cameroun) was created in May 1967 under a con-
cession period of 40 years with the mission to undertake all tasks in the drinking water
 provision including production, transport, distribution and marketing of water resources in
urban und sub-urban areas in Cameroon. In its main phase SNEC managed the drinking
water provision in 105 urban centers of 225000 users, which means by a population of
15,51 million in 1999 that SNEC supplied 1,5 % of the inhabitants. The system had a pro-
duction capacity of 450000 m³/day, which nowadays would cover a bit more than the daily
demand of Yaoundé with 350000 m³/day.

SNEC

5.3.1.2 CamWater
CamWater is the public water enterprise on behalf of MIN EE since 2005
explains: “CamWater is the government. […] It belongs to the government”,
“it is a public company acting on behalf of the government” (EXP. 03,
16.04.2013) with its own administration of justice and financial autonomy but
under the administrative supervision of MIN EE, the financial supervision of
MINFI (CAMWATER 2013B) and technical support by SetTunise (EXP. 12,
28.05.2013). This means CamWater is not in direct contact with financial do-
The budget chain goes from the donors to MINFI followed by MINEE and finally to CamWater, which decelerated the capacity to act. In return CamWater hands over monthly technical reports to the donors, which are appreciated according to EXP. 9 (04.06.2013).

“Every time you have to convince them. You have to convince them again and again. If you don’t convince them, there will be no money.” (Exp. 8).

The objective of CamWater is to manage the public water service for the urban and sub-urban areas in the whole country including the following mission interests (CAMWATER 2013, 2014):

- Planning, researching, mobilizing and managing of funds for all infrastructural works which are needed to extract, produce, transport, distribute and store drinking water
- Constructing, maintaining and managing of infrastructure for production, stocking and transportation of potable water
- Quality control of public service operations, drinking water distribution and other tasks entrusted to the companies being responsible for the public water distribution service
- Information-providing and awareness-rising for user groups of public drinking water service in urban and sub-urban areas in cooperation with the operating companies
- Taking care of all commercial, industrial and financial operations, which relate to the objects or conduce to their development.

With regard to the statements of EXP. 5, 8 and 9 in 2013, CamWater focalises less on urban and sub-urban areas in general, than more on the major cities Douala and Yaoundé, which correlates with the international donation and investments (chapter 5.3.2). Clarified by EXP. 5 (16.05.2013) this is one of the reasons why Cameroon cannot reach the target that 75% of the population will be provided with drinking water till 2020 (see chapter 5.2.3 about GESP).

Since April 2012 the current director of MINEE has been Mr Wilhelm Sollo. He is a technical engineer with educational background in forestry and is held in high esteem by his employees (EXP. 9, 04.06.2013). The headquarter counts
only two to three further environmental or water experts (Exp. 9 & 11, 04.06.2013) and as Exp. 9 (04.06.2013) emphasizes “the headquarter is big”, which shows the low human resource capacity. CamWater declares, its own administration is still embedded in the national structures with high administrative effort including a multitude of written reports and lacking working autonomy (Exp. 9, 04.06.2013). The AFD (2013) criticized CamWater’s management capacities as weak.

The positive aspects mentioned by the expert interview partners are the payment and that the current director of MINEE can exhibit a technical education background. The constraints can be summarized after Exp. 8 (21.05.2013) by the following buzzwords: High bureaucracy, administration, number of involved ministries, corruption and low human capacity and financial autonomy. Unfortunately, the infrastructural situation of the supply system remains scruffy and leaky. Furthermore the observation in the TAU CamWater reflect low working motivation of each of the employees due to low accountability recovered by formal and informal structures.

5.3.1.3 CDE

The government did a call for tender to proceed with the mismanagement of the drinking water supply by SNEC. Camerounaise des Eaux (CDE) applied to undertake the public utility service and got the contract (Exp. 9, 04.06.2013).

CDE is a subsidiary of Office National de l'Eau Potable (ONEP) from Morocco under the Cameroonian law, which started its activities in May 2008 for a period of ten years covered by the lease (JUOMPAN-YAKAM 2011; CDE 2012; Exp. 9, 04.06.2013). The current General Manager, Mr. Brahim Ramdane, an engineer with educational background of urban and land management has held various positions of responsibility within CDE since 2008 and has been in office since January 2011. He is described as a young and competent manager (GMG 2014). Due to Mr Ramdane the objective of CDE is to increase the provision of drinking water in urban areas by 35 % to 60 % (JUOMPAN-YAKAM 2011). The mission is to provide drinking water in 110 urban and sub-urban centres within the terms of the lease and to increase the level of access based on the following interests (CDE 2012):
Analysis National Level:

- Treatment, transport, distribution and marketing of public water;
- Carrying out maintenances and repair of all assets;
- The realization of extension and rehabilitation works;
- Improving of access to drinking water within a view to enhance the service ration.

The enterprise states on its website to base its action on three main values: (i) good governance (ii) professionalism and (iii) quality of service and to work with new technology and train their human resources to ensure efficiency of production, transport and distribution. In general, Exp. 14 (03.06.2013) affirms that the human resources are good and well educated but in average too old as demonstrated in the case of CamWater. All former employees of SNEC had to be undertaken by CDE as the case of Exp. 14.

CDE is running several projects by an estimated budget of 457 to 610 million € in 2011 (JUOMPANYAKAM 2011). It is active in the North, South, East, West and Central region again with focus on the major cities Yaoundé or Douala (CDE 2012; Exp. 14, 03.06.2013). The working conditions, like office equipment and salary are not satisfying due to Exp. 14.

In theory CDEs capacities base on human and technical resources, interests as well as values. But in reality, the following points determine the efficacy of CDEs (Observations and open discussion March - June 2013, Exp. 9, 12, 14, 16 May – June 2013):

- The treatment, transport and distribution of water is limited by the fact that CDE depends on the available infrastructure provided by CamWater, which lowers the service coverage and highly slows down the process. CDE has to ration the water every day. The number of drinking water connections in the regional water management direction Yaoundé is unknown (Exp. 14, 03.06.2013).

- Concerning maintenance CDE conducts a special emergency stuff in each area. The idea is that customers call an emergency hotline in case a pipe is lacking or not working. In theory, the emergency team becomes immediately active (Exp. 14, 03.06.2013). But the reality is that either the pipe
stays lacking or the water is cut off at the last junction of the pipe. Subsequently, the whole area has no water for an indefinable time.

- The realization of extension work in the urban areas is more or less delegated to several households. Apriori, the water connection to a plot depends on the distance to the nearest CDE supplied water pipe but may not exceed 50 metres. Further hindrances are roads or buildings, which cannot be destroyed to set up a water connection (Exp. 14 & 16, 03.06.2013). The procedure including connection, subscription, water pump and water clock has to be paid by the household.

- CDE speaks about a welfare project subsidizing 50000 new drinking water connections in 2003. Due to Exp. 14 (03.06.2014) no new connection was realized till May 2013.

- The service ration got enhanced but not efficient enough to secure the drinking water provision (see chapter 0). At least for the division of Yaoundé, CDE has no knowledge about the number of connected households (Exp. 14, 03.06.2013) which goes towards imprecise data base.

- The customers have to pay the bills directly to CDE within 10 days and CDE has to pay the government (Exp. 9, 04.06.2013), but solely for the amount of water that has been sold. CDE pays fees to CamWater per cubic meter distributed water to the customer, not for the water losses due to obsoleted infrastructures. Exp. 12 resumed by this reason CDE is not forced to invest in maintenance.

5.3.2 International Donors

Based on the latest information of CAMWATER (2013), the international donors to improve the drinking water supply in Cameroon are the World Bank, AfDB, EIB, EXIM Bank China and AFD. Additionally according to the World Bank (2010) also Germany and the IMF and due to Exp. 15 (05.06.2013) AMCOW count to the international donors in the drinking water sector in Cameroon. AMCOW (2010) explains that the drinking water sector has started to regain the trust of development partners and the external investments increased in the period from 2010 to 2012 compared with the decrease between 2002 and 2007.
Due to CAMWATER (2007) the international investment in the drinking water sector amounts 359.5 million € (period is not mentioned).

Beside the engagement in the water sector, all donors boost in good governance, growth, privatization and decentralization (AfDB 2009; EIB 2009; WORLD BANK 2010; AFD 2013). The strategies and investments of some of the donors are shortly presented as followed.

**World Bank**

Cameroon and the World Bank celebrated 50 years of partnership in 2013. The WORLD BANK (2010) states that the partnership is at the moment at a “critical junction” since the Bank is acknowledged as a strong trust partner but in public often blamed for the Cameroonian weak economic situation (see chapter 4.3). For the World Bank the problem of water scarcity is a problem of failed public service (World bank 2011). The current partnership bases on the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 2010 - 2014 and tries to align with the objectives of GESP (2010-2020). In course of drinking water provision the Bank in partnership with France and Germany financed a program to improved basic services among the others for water and sanitation. An on-going program for Urban and Water Development (PDUE) supports the following:

- To increase the access of the urban population, particularly those living in low-income settlements, to basic infrastructure and services, including water
- With focus on five municipalities, named Bamenda, Douala, Maroua, Mbalmayo, and Yaoundé.

Within the program two water provision projects were running, both managed by the same team leader and ministry MINHUD with a respective project cost of 63,9 million € and 21,9 million €. None of the projects is on the track to reach its aims and even the last closed project concerning drinking water by the same project manager did not achieve its targets at all (WORLD BANK 2014).

**AfDB**

The African Development Bank (AfDB) bases its collaboration with Cameroon on the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2010 - 14 with regard to the GESP objectives, particular growth and poverty reduction. The Bank emphasizes to take “[…] advantage of Cameroon’s strengths and opportunities through the removal of the constraints […]” (AfDB 2009:22). The current Bank strategy
paper seems likely to stress the access to drinking water less than the previous of 2005 – 09 but nevertheless aims to “Improve Community Infrastructure by Enhancing Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation” (AfDB 2009:19). To the interests count:

- Support to rural and semi-urban areas including rehabilitation and network extensions
- Co-financing of the government
- Improved access to drinking water for almost two million more people

Another international donor in Cameroon is the European Investment Bank (EIB), which implements the EU’s external and development policies. Due to the Country Strategy Paper 2008 - 2013 the EU has invested 239 million € in Cameroon in view of the PRSP. In the rural sector the EU has declared the support of improved drinking water supply as an important circumstance for enhanced living conditions (EU 2008). The EIB invests 40 million € on-lent by the government to the public enterprise CamWater in co-financing with the AFD in 2008 with the interest to improve the drinking water provision in sub- and urban areas by:

- Supporting 180,000 household connections, improving 200,000 existing water services in cities, constructing and rehabilitating water treatment plants and upgrading facilities for the transfer, storage and distribution of drinking water in Yaoundé, Ngoundere, Edea and Bertona (EU 2008, EIB 2009). This includes the rehabilitation of the Mefou Dam (s. chapter 6.3) (EIB 2009, 2011).

Likewise the objectives of the French Development Agency (AFD) in the drinking water sector are to increase the access rate of drinking water in the above-mentioned cities and support the management capacities of CamWater in order to realize success of the reform process. All in all the AFD apprises the situation of urban water supply as still critical and the management capacities of CamWater as weak (AFD 2013b).

“La mise en service de la station de la Méfou n’apportera qu’un répit temporaire et le développement de capacités de production supplémentaires est nécessaire.” (AFD 2013b)
The AFD and Cameroon can fall back on a 54 year existing partnership and Cameroon is its main beneficiary of the whole Africa funding by approx. 230,75 million € per year since 2002 (AFD 2013a). The Agency is acting in six sectors, one of them is the water sector with a budget amount of 22% of the 230,75 million € in the period of 2006 - 2012 (AFD 2013b).

**IMF**

The International Monetary Found, rarely criticized for its pro-privatization strategy in the Global South is an additional donor in the Cameroonian drinking water sector. In the frame of this thesis more precised information about the IMF investment in the drinking water sector could not have been gathered.

**China EXIM Bank**

Furthermore China represented by the EXIM Bank invests in the drinking water sector with a concessional loan of approx. 16.8 million € repayable over 25 years. The intention is to enhance the drinking water provision in Douala, leaning on the Mungo River (CAMWATER 2007). With additional investments of 10.6 million € by CamWater, the new installation is already functioning since June 2010 and produces 50,000 m³ water per day for Douala. The realization is one part of a tripartite project (CAMWATER 2010).

### 5.3.3 Civil Society

Due to the partial statistics in Cameroon a clear number of the involved civil society organizations (CSO) also known as NGOs, in the drinking water sector is not available (GWP 2009d). However, a legal framework exists and the civil society movement was boosted by the first association legislation (Law No. 90-053) in 1990 and the NGO-Act (Law No 99/014) in 1999 (RUTINWA 2001; NYAMBO 2008; JME CONFERENCE 22.03.2013). It does away with the requirement of the prior ministry authorization but the state has by laws the power to interfere in the affairs of civic associations whose objectives or activities are perceived as challenging to the ruling elite (RUTINWA 2001). On the one hand Exp. 1 (23.03.2013) describes the situation as positive, the civil society gets the permission for associations by law but on the other hand “nobody listen to them”. International NGOs in the water sector are virtually absent (AMCOW 2010). Deductive, the capacity of civil society in Cameroon tends to be weak. Clauses and legal instruments, like the Penal Coad, are embedded in the law and can severely be used to restrict CSO activities. Cooperation, re-
pectively communication between the government and NGOs is failing by the missing political will and the access to information is weak (NYAMBO 2008; KONINGS 2011; JME CONFERENCE 22.03.2013).

At the JME - Conference 2013 several NGOs, who are actively engaged to improve the provision of drinking water participated. To them belong among the others Young Volunteer for Environment (JVE), Better World, Association for Development Actors (ADEV) and Dynamique Citoyenne (DC). The conference started with a four hours delay and the solely participation of low powered MINEE employees, which affirmed the assumption that the theoretical CSO participation in the water sector is higher than the real one.

For example DC a network of NGOs is engaged in new ways as monitor organ and scrutiniser of development activities (COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION 2013). Each year the association focuses on another main topic, in 2013 it was: “L’accès à l’eau est un doit!” (The access to water is a right) with the message: “Donnez nous l’eau portable” (Give us drinking water) (DC 22.03.2013). During the week of the International Water Day 2013 Dynamique Citoyenne organized three water sensitization meetings in Yaoundé, in three areas (Montesquieu, Anguissa and Nkoldongo), which are highly suffering from lacking access to drinking water, which were flushed with a small demonstration with buckets and cans on 22nd March 2013 (Figure 5–7). The demonstration in a marginal area of Yaoundé was the first one in Cameroon since it is a criminal offence to demonstrate against the Cameroonian law (EXP. 1, 23.03.2013).

Based on the classification by PARTZSCH (2007) DC as well as YVE can be classified between critical and constructive NGOs. Both are not really against water prices or privatization, but more against bad governance in the water sector in general. In the following citation EXP. 1 (23.03.2013), a member of DC and EXP. 2 (25.03.203), member of JVE, express the opportunities and threats of the civil society in Cameroon:

“Nowadays the people can criticize but nobody listens to them. [...] But I recognized a development in a good direction since Cameroon is freer. [...] We are in a train of evolution [...] the change of spirit in the people will bring the change in the country. We are in a period of changes. Changes like the Mauerfall 1989 change a lot” (EXP. 1, 23.03.2013). But, “You know, children in Cameroon are like their fathers: They do not want to change, they do not want to think. They do not think how all Cameroonian can benefit from a strategy” (EXP. 2, 25.03.203).
Another active deputy of the CSO is the QUANGO Global Water Partnership. It cooperates with the government to develop an IWRM policy, but is also lacking efficiency. Further information about GWP’s interests are presented in chapter 5.2.4.

To sum up, mixes of legal legitimation of civil society, missing political will, missing transparency and unequal power allocation hamper the engagement of the civil society in Cameroon, even if they have more power than ten years ago.

5.4 Critical Reflection

The chapter considered the most involved and important stakeholders. Beside PPP, the government remains the main actor in the DWG in Cameroon by its deputy MINEE, which is due to SWYNGEDOUW (2005) and DOBENER (2010) a precondition to cope with the negative facts of neoliberal mainstream and increasing privatization. But nevertheless, distribution of drinking water as well
as the role between and within stakeholders remains uncertain. MINEE is lacking behind its objectives of elaborating a water policy and coordinating the stakeholder tasks, which would be fundamental to take account for action.

Obviously, theory and practice diverge widely as shown by the implementation of the NWC or participation power of civil society. It expressed the pseudo-willingness to change. But willingness would be needed to get the way for effective water management after the understanding of good governance. That and the fact of hierarchical interests and clientalistic structures operate against efficient and effective drinking water management. The lacking representation of women in relevant positions in the water sector expresses the nation-wide low empowerment of women. The actor’s disability to solve the problem rides on the civil society. With regard to the private water company it is doubtful how they will reach the objected drinking water provision in 110 urban areas when they have depended on the production, stocking and transportation infrastructure neglected by SNEC for the last 20 years and not yet have caught up by CamWater. Additionally, the international financial investment intent on five not 110 urban centres, which could be a constraint for the governmental and donor intended decentralization. Despite the rising investment in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon, the process of budget planning and allocation is erratic. No department is able to provide data pertaining this matter. The stakeholders are not on the way to cope with the mismanagement and urban population growth. On national level, despite the decentralization process, the budget preparation process remains highly centralized at MINFI level, which slowed the budget allocation and purpose of the other sector ministries. The financial investment from international financial institutions is high. However, a decentralized money flow and transparent and effective management is low based on corrupt structures.

The research thesis presents a first insight of the interest, capacities and linkages of actors to understand the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon. Interesting questions remain unconcerned which in return open up the way for further assessments as discussed in chapter 7.3.
6 Analysis Local Level – Case Study Upper Mefou Watershed

6.1 Conditions and informal institutional structures in the Upper Mefou Watershed

The main river in the watershed is the Mefou River, which is a tributary of the Nyong River, located in the same-named Nyong-Costal River Watershed near the border to the Sanaga Watershed (Figure A 2). The study area, called after its main river Upper Mefou Watershed, is located in the Central Region of Cameroon at the city boundary to Yaoundé at the bridge to the rural area. The watershed is calculated based on an elevation model with the outlet located in Nkolbisson in an area that already belongs to the capital Yaoundé at UTM 32, 772132, 428414 (701 m a.s.l.; SRTM – Shuttle Radar, topography mission, spatial resolution 90m). The area of the watershed extends about 97km², covered with a mostly dense humid forest including around 15 localities with 100 till 2000 inhabitants each. The latest census was done in 2005 (BUCREP 2005). Further, the sub-watershed can be classified in its administrative, climate and chiefdom zones.
Figure 6–1: The Study Area at Local Level: The Upper Mefou Watershed

Source: OTT 2013.

Administratively it is divided into the Mfoundi and Lekie division with its corresponding sub-divisions. The localities Nkolbission, Minkoameyos, Nkolafeme, Leboudi II, Ngoya II and Ekong are already taken into the urban area of the Mfoundi division, which includes the sub-divisions Yaoundé VII and Yaoundé II (Figure 6–1). The other part of the catchment, called Lekie division, is made up of the Lobo and Okola sub-division. Furthermore villages can be subdivided into so-called “harmeux” as in Ekong (HH 41, 29.05.2014).

Climatically, the Upper Mefou sub-catchment is shaped by the Equatorial climate zone, which is characterized by high temperature (21 – 23° C) and humidity. Two rainy (mid-February to June & September to mid-November) and two dry seasons (mid-November to mid-February & July to August) occur. In a workshop to “IWM Capacity Building” in November 2013 the stakeholders stated the temperature maximum amounts 35° C and the annual rainfall approx. 1600 mm, with extremes between 1000 – 2100 mm. This is just an approximation since the climatological database is poor and in the hilly Mefou sub-catchment just one pluviometer is available, implemented by the IWM.
project members in November 2012 registered by a villager twice a day (Figure 6–2).

Figure 6–2: Village Ekong. Mr Mbaye taking care of the Pluviometer
Source: OTT 2013.

The Mefou is rising in the Mbam Minkom Mountain and joins the Nyong river at Odou after a length of 121 km. A variety of tributaries as the Zamengoe, Nkoi, Afeumev, Benyam, Ekou, Nkeno, Nguamekon, Eteme, Wabo, Moba Mezom (Elephant foot) and Minfo’o (main river separating Etoud and Mikomeyos) flow within the Upper Mefou Watershed (TOPOGRAPHIC MAP 1954; HH 20, 18.05.2013)

The infrastructural level is weak. Beside the main road as connection to the capital and the nearness to the old main road connection Yaoundé-Douala, the roads are in bad conditions and not passable during the rainy season, which inhibits movement to the urban area and within the sub-catchment (Figure 6–3). 37 % of the interviewed households have access to electricity, not implicating that the provision is permanent.
The watershed amounts 17589 inhabitants, with 50.5 % female and 49.5 % male population based on the census 2005. They are distributed in 3133 households (HH) deductive one HH is averagely composed out of 5.6 members (Figure 6–4). Out of it, only 44 HH could have been interviewed, that only provide an insight into the local actor and structure situation concerning the access to drinking water. The population is growing, influenced by the ongoing urbanization of Yaoundé in direction to the watershed as shown in Figure 6–1. For half of the interview partners the sub-catchment is the place of origin, the other half moved there between 1962 and 2013, one third of it during the last five years (2008 till 2013) which comes along with a progressing deforestation and increasing demand of drinking water (Figure A-3). The villages expand and new land becomes developed as the outposts in Nouma built during the last 15 years (HH ID 35, 23.05.2014).
The land and house tenures in the watershed are typical of those of South Cameroon (CAMWATER - TAU MEFOU 2012). 90% of the interviewed HH do not have an official document about their houses, which are in 49% of the cases out of stone and 51% made out of loam or wood (Figure 6–5).

The on-going migration implicates also a growing diversity of ethnical groups. The ethnical group Eton represented by more than 56% of the interview partners is overrepresented. Further ethnical groups are Bassa, Bafia, Bastibo, Befang, Be mileke, Emoudo, Etown and Ewondo. 36 interview partners spoke about their religious background: all are Catholic apart from two. The ethnical diversity was not figured as conflicted potential by the interview partners. But an IWM Workshop in November 2013 ethnical diversity was mentioned as a conflicts potential. On the local level the several chiefdoms are a further important classification feature, which are in the Upper Mefou Watershed composed of the different ethnical groups. The chiefdoms in Cameroon are institutional formations on the local and regional level with power almost independent from national institutions, which reflects the multilevelness of the “society in the society” (IGNATOWSKI 2004). Each village in the catchment has its own chief of 3rd degree, which is supervised by a chief of 2nd and chief of 1st degree. The chief is the highest instance in a village, the first contact person for national water stakeholders as CamWater or NGOs and the actor who has to be
always informed about rural events (Discussion with Exp. 1 and Students of the IWM R&D CB-Project 2013).

Figure 6–5: (R) House out of Loam in Etoud; (L.) House out of Stone in Nouma.

Source: OTT 2013.

In the level of education, 80 % of the interview partners expressed their educational background, which shows that all of them visited school but in total the ratio of male and female villagers with higher education is 4:1. In two of the HH’s only boys are going to school and one HH is not able to send any of its children to school because of financial reasons. The niveau of schooling is poor since most of the teachers do not have a qualification in the subjects they teach and the salary is low.

The main income source in the Upper Mefou alike on national level is the informal sector with approx. 82 %, out of it alone 43 % agriculture. The public sector compromised 9 %, the private sector 5 % and another 5% of the interviewed villagers are retired. In the formal sector are three times more male than female villagers employed. More than half of the households generate their income out of two to three occupations but still more than 53 % of the villagers have less than 600CFA per day to live on (600CFA = 0,92 € at the 31.05.2013) (Figure 6–6).
The participation in social meetings and groups is an important access possibility for information and exchange. 85% of the interviewed villagers know about meetings and 64% attend regularly such village-based meetings. The collaboration among the villages is barely visible. The meetings are mainly mixed but with a domination of male against female participants (2:1). The meetings are generally open to everyone but not attended by people from outside the village beside experts. Relevant requirements to attend a meeting are age and the ability to pay inscription and member fees. The motivation to attend a meeting is in most of the cases a financial support according to the model of a “Tantin”. Furthermore social aspects and village development in general take an important part in the meetings.

6.2 Access to Drinking Water

Based on the climatologic conditions each villager in the Upper Mefou should have at least sufficient access to drinking water. With regard to the principles of the Human Right to Water the question is if this is the case in reality?

In the humid study area the main access resource for 64% of the households is a public water pump Table 6-1.
The connections to CamWater networks remain low. In case there are available the water is not safe and drinkable (HH 17 & 21 on 18.05.2013; CAMWATER – TAU 2012). Only the HH of the chief of the village Minkoameryos, has a château as drinking water resource implemented and is weekly refilled by CamWater. 80 % of the HHs know who implemented the water resources and 77 % know the date of activation (Table 6-2). Most became implemented between 2011 - 2013, which comprises 22 %. Between 2008 and 2010 16 %, between 2000 - 2006 14 % and between 1996 - 2000 11 %. In most of the cases either the church or NGO’s have implemented the water resource. An increase of water access resources has only a sustainable impact if maintenance is accomplished. The maintenance rate is at approx. 75 % of the households either by cleaning service or financial distribution.

Table 6-1: Drinking Water Access Resources
(Mentioned as the first resource to drinking water)

| Source: OTT 2013. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public water pump</th>
<th>Public “forage d'eau”</th>
<th>Private water pumps</th>
<th>Pipe system</th>
<th>Rivers</th>
<th>Château</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-2: Implementer of the Water Resource

| Source: OTT 2014. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church/Priest</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>NGO - OTE-LE</th>
<th>Cam-Cam-Water</th>
<th>House owner (private)</th>
<th>Villager (Public)</th>
<th>Chief</th>
<th>Chat Pipe</th>
<th>No information</th>
<th>Bottle water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
maximum quantity of drinking water has 30 litres per person and day (HH ID 29, 22.05.2014). The average distance to carry water is calculated as 580 m one-way, which takes 91 % of the villagers not more than 30 minutes. According to the indicators of the human right to water this duration is accessible and acceptable. Traditionally, the task to carry water remains mainly in the hand of children and women (Exp. 1, 23.03.2013), in the Upper Mefou in 71 % of the cases children are obligated to carry water once or twice a day. Adults, comparatively more female, carry water by the time the children are still too young (Table 6-3).

34 household members spoke about the attendance at meetings with a water related focus. Out of them, 57 % of the male and 39 % of the female interview partners, participated in such a meeting. The number of meetings increased since the Mefou Dam was under reconstruction with the objective to improve the drinking water supply of the capital.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Affordable</th>
<th>Equitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient, 50-100l per day</td>
<td>(Safe)</td>
<td>(less than 30min, gender, participation)</td>
<td>(1.5km in rural; 0.2km in urban areas)</td>
<td>(socio-economic value, &lt; 3 % of income)</td>
<td>(gender, class, sex etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No HH has 50l of safe drinking water per day.</td>
<td>90% of water resources are drinkable due to the survey</td>
<td>90% of the action to carry water takes less than 30min</td>
<td>Rural area; in 95.5 % the distance to a functional drinking water resource is shorter than 1km</td>
<td>Payment for drinking water by 5 HH; 3 of them pay more than 3 % of HH income</td>
<td>Children carry water in 71 % of the HH; comparatively a bit more boys than girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High faecal contamination in the rivers</td>
<td>Participation in meetings concerning water are dominated by male villagers and chiefs</td>
<td>Less than 200 m distance for 52.3 % of HH</td>
<td>Contact with stakeholders like CamWater have 3 men in proportion to 1 women</td>
<td>73 % of the HH pay for maintenance; 2 HH pay monthly more than 3% of their income; Most HH pay 1000 - 2000 CFA¹ in case a water resource is broken</td>
<td>Adults carry water in case children are still too young; co-operatively more women than men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 6-3: The Human Right to Water Indicators in the Upper Mefou Watershed |

| Not achieved; | ongoing; | achieved. 1 € = 656 CFA¹ |

Source: OTT 2014 after HH interviews 2013; open discussion with CamWater 2013.

### 6.3 Example of the Mefou Dam Reconstruction for Drinking Water Provision

A special characteristic of the watershed is a dam named Mefou, constructed and taken in place in 1960 (EXP. 5, 6, 8, 10 March - June 2013) which supplied Yaoundé with freshwater till 1999 (EXP. 3; 16.04.2013). Afterwards it became abandoned since a new dam named Akomeyda was able to produce
100000 m³. That was sufficient for the population of Yaoundé in the 1980ies (EXP. 11, 04.06.2014). Recently in 2012 the government decided to rehabilitate the dam by increasing the lake level by 30 cm, renew the pipe system at the discharge and reconstruct the water treatment station in Nkolbisson and the control station Messa (CAMWATER - TAU MEFOU 2013B; EXP. 3, 16.04.2013; EXP. 10, 28.05.2014) (Figure 6–7).

The objective is that the Mefou Dam can contribute 50000 m³ freshwater per day for the provision of the capital. The Mefou rehabilitation work started in April 2012 (EXP. 11, 04.06.2014), since January 2014 the dam has been in use again (NDOUYOU-MOULIOM 2014; NNANG 2014).

Figure 6–7: The Water Level of the Mefou on 10th March and 16th April 2013
Source: OTT 2013.

The executive body for the rehabilitation is CamWater via a Technical Assistance Unite (TAU) (CAMWATER - TAU MEFOU 20013A; EXP. 08, 10, 21. & 28.05.2013). Further involved stakeholders in the rehabilitation and reconstruction work are CDE, MINEE, MINEPAT and MINFI, Raziel, Satcom and Pfeiffer as well as the Prime Minister (Table 6-4). The project is financed by the World Bank (EXP. 09; 04.06.2014), French Development Agency (NDOUYOU-MOULIOM 2014) and EUI (EXP. 3, 16.04.2013). Mr Ramdane, the chef of CDE assumed the expense for the rehabilitation to be 11 million € in total (JUOMPAN-YAKAM 2011). Due to CamWater – TAU (2012) the cost is about approx. 5 million € not including the establishment of “environment” department in CamWater and operations to support the work.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>Coordination of the Mefou project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Responsible for the rehabilitation of the dam and treatment station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implementation of the Environmental-Social-Management-Plan (ESMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Reconstruction of the water treatment station Messa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, AFD, EUI</td>
<td>Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEE, MINEPAT &amp; MINFI</td>
<td>• Power of decision concerning the financing of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>• Power of decision concerning the start of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razel</td>
<td>Executing Agency. In charge of the construction work (in the 1960ties as well as during the recent rehabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cleaning of the Mefou lake before refilling with water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satcom</td>
<td>Executing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SetTunise</td>
<td>Advice and control body of CamWater, employed by CamWater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfeiffer</td>
<td>Sanitation of the water pipelines. The old pipes have been interpolated into the new ones. From Nkolbisson till the water treatment station Messa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villagers</td>
<td>At the beginning several villagers were employed in the project to do cleaning tasks at the Mefou. The motivation to recruit them is “they are lazy and not disciplined” (EXP. 3, 16.04.2013). CamWater is in contact with the villagers of Etoud, Ozom I and Minkomeyos, especially with the chiefs. CamWater organized focused group discussions and will financially compensate the villagers who are affected by the Mefou activation. Till June 2013 the compensation did not have started.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6-4: Stakeholders in the Mefou Dam Rehabilitation**


CamWater is in contact mainly with the villagers from Etoud, Ozom I and Minkomeyos since they are the most effected due to EXP. 09 (04.06.2013). CamWater divided the area around and below the dam in three parts (AD1, AD2 and AD3), which are related to resettlements and losses of agricultural fields, pollution control and awareness raising (EXP. 5, 16.05.2013, CAMWATER - TAU 2012). Due to EXP. 8 (21.05.2013) the divided areas are based on the international law, social aspects and topography but have to be redefined which has not been accomplished till June 2013. CAMWATER (2012) remarked the rehabilitation cases including various negative social impacts for which mit-
igation meausures will be implemented into three protection zones depending on the division. In the protection zone AD1 it is not allowed to construct new buildings anymore, which is not complied with as shown in Figure 6–8 (CAM-WATER 2012). More expensive buildings and fields occupy especially the area directly around the lake on the slope side, e.g. the building of the mayor Yaoundé VII but they do not become resettled, still more buildings are built.

Figure 6–8: Construction Work close to the Mefou Dam in the village Minkoameyos
Source: OTT 2013.

The socio-economic assessment in the area by CamWater was not conducted till 21st May 2013 (EXP. 7, 21.05.2013), but the rehabilitation is executed in bounding strips. 36 % of the interviewed households are affected by the reconstruction. 14 % will lose their agricultural fields and one household is mentioned to become resettled (HH 14, 18.04.2013).

Box 10: Three Steps in the Rehabilitation of the Mefou Dam Rehabilitation Project

CamWater divided the dam in three lots (parts) Lot1, Lot2 and Lot3. Lot 1 stands for rehabilitation: It stands for the rehabilitation of the dam, the MESSA station with the water rehabilitation unit (3 x 9500 m³) and the remote control centre (sall de passage). Lot 2 stands for sanitation: Retrying and reconstruction of the water treatment unit from August 2011 till November 2013. The water treatment unit includes three steps: Sedimentation, filter and the stock of 400,000 m³ water. The good and clean water is transported in two main pipes one is for 500 m³ water and the other are for 600 m³ water. Lot 3 stands for distribution. After the sanitation the water has to be distributed.
The TAU of CamWater, which has for the project unit only one project computer but several pickups and TVs, struggles with the high bureaucracy and lacking financial autonomy (EXP. 08, 21.05.2013). The Technical Assistance Unit depends on the financial mobilization from CamWater headquarter in Douala, which is slow due to CamWater (2013b). Deductive the project progress was slowed down. Cooperation between the IWM project and TAU CamWater is not easy to establish since from both sides networking and information exchange is not officially existent till April 2013. The low level of cooperation and data exchange point to the fact that pieces of information are liked to be hidden.

Based on the lack of measuring instruments and data, TAU of CamWater neither knows which rivers infiltrate in the dam nor the amount of water (EXP. 8, OPEN DISCUSSION WITH CAMWATER IN THE UPPER MEFOU WATERSHED 16.05.2014). The CamWater TAU report (2012) refers to the bathymetric survey, which was due to EXP. 8 not accomplished (OPEN DISCUSSION APRIL 2013). Anyhow it is a first success in the improvement of drinking water supply for Yaoundé. The city needs at least 350000 m³ of fresh water per day. The Akomeyda dam can produce, 150000 m³ per day after its rehabilitation is finished. That means, even after the rehabilitation and reconstruction work is accomplished 150000 m³ water per day are still missing for Yaoundé (EXP. 11, 04.06.2014). Especially already excluded areas of the city will not benefit due to missing infrastructure and maintenance work at the pipe system (Ndouyou-Mouliom 2014). Areas, which take profit, are due to EXP. 12 (28.05.2013) Bastos, the American embassy and the residence of the president. Leftovers will be distributed to other parts of Yaoundé. EXP. 5 (16.05.2013) states also areas within the watershed will take profit like Etoud, Ozom I and Minkoameyos. CamWater has for compensation a budget of 152,5 thousand € a year since 2012 (the amount varies by the interviews). Till June 2013 no compensation was conducted since they “[…] have to wait for the money of the finance ministry“ and a document from the Prime Minister (EXP. 9 04.06.2013).
In general, the opinion of the villagers about the reconstruction is quite positive, since most of them are satisfied that the water supply of Yaoundé will be improved. Furthermore most of the villagers expect that the supply in the rural area will be improved since CamWater is using the water from the Mefou-River. CamWater lacks behind the compensatory..

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-division</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>First general result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below the Dam</td>
<td>Nkolbisson,</td>
<td>Urban part of watershed; Decreased flood frequency since dam is under reconstruction; Positive attitude of villager about reconstruction. But areas below the dam are exposed to floods. In case of land losses villager expect compensations; Expectation that the water pressure in the hand pumps will improve. The village Ebot-Mefou and Ferm are exposed to life risks as soon as the Mefou is taken into action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(YAOUNDÉ VII)</td>
<td>Minkomeyos,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ebot-Mefou,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to the Dam</td>
<td>Ozom II</td>
<td>Rural part; Mefou-River is passing by Ozom II; Villagers had one meeting with CamWater; Generally positive attitude about reconstruction; But expectation that CamWater will develop water supply and road conditions of the village since CamWater is using their river water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LOBO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above the Dam</td>
<td>Etoud,</td>
<td>Rural part; Mefou-River is passing the villages; see Ozom II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OKOLA)</td>
<td>Metak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-5: Profit and Loss of the Activation of the Mefou Dam

Source: OTT 2013.

6.4 Critical reflection

National and international structures as well as water actor interests, capacities and interrelations are recognizable on local level in the Upper Mefou Watershed. But the local field research only presents an overview due to the following facts: (i) the research sample is comparatively small for the large study area, (ii) the data base about climatology and population, which does not include the villages Nkolkos, Akolafid and Douma, are poor, (iii) remote villages are not easily reachable, and because of infrastructural facilities and language barriers (iv), especially questions concerning personal information like the economic situation call for a longer field study.

Nevertheless, the mentioned critical points express the national conditions: The data base for the whole country is poor and not updated, infrastructural facilities are not sufficient but important for drinking water and information access as well as individual livelihood development. National and local diversity
underline the expression “Cameroon - Africa in miniature”. The nation wide domination of informal agriculture as a main income source is also present in the Upper Mefou Watershed, which correlates with the bad infrastructural facilities. Likewise, power to improve the access to drinking water plays an important role on local as well as on national level. Hierarchically organized, the most powerful actors are the traditional “informal” institutions of chiefdoms, which experience nation wide institutional acceptance. But no stakeholder can efficiently act if a higher institutional authority slows down a process. Power changes within a village by age, sex and economical condition. Inequality and corrupt structures are reflected in the Mefou Dam rehabilitation project, which is realized with “a delay” of 20 years. Inequality in the access to drinking water is expressed by the ration that only a minority, which lives in the most powerful areas of Yaoundé, will take profit of it. Corrupt, clientilistic and low capacity structures of stakeholders (e.g. CamWater) are apparent in the Mefou Dam Project, as for example (i) preferential treatment of the mayor of Yaoundé VII, (ii) spontaneous classification of protection zones around the reservoir and (iii) the delayed socio-economic assessment as well as compensation of effected people.

In the Upper Mefou Watershed the access to drinking water is not the most threatened challenge but with regard to the climatological circumstances not sufficient. Sensitization for drinking water management activities like maintenance is relatively good compared to the nation wide conditions. However, Even if the number of drinking water pumps rose in the last years with regard to the growing urbanization and migration in the area, the drinking water governance still drags behind 20 years.
7 Result Analysis and Discussion

The result analysis and discussion falls back on the interim conclusions and is structured by the analysing framework to answer the research questions (1-4).

Research Question 1

What are the causes of the technical and man-made inducted problems in the access to drinking water in Cameroon?

In most of the Cameroonian areas, the lacking access to drinking water is not caused by physical shortages, equally in the case study area Upper Mefou Watershed. The present research outlines that there is not a single cause, the problem is created by complex, interweaved and many-faced influences. An overriding influence comes from outside the of the water sector:

The strong manifestation of corruption and clientilism characterizes all levels of action likewise in the DWG. It bases on the historical, political and economic conditions as well as the traditional way of life, family and educational upbringing and suppression of accountability. Thus, all challenges in the drinking water sector are based on the problem of corruption and clientilism and result in a general management problem of drinking water. Therefore, all stakeholders neglected the management of drinking water provision for the last two decades. Continuously, the inability is high to achieve sufficient, safe, equal, acceptable and affordable circumstances for drinking water access.

Both, corruption and clientilism are the main causes of the technical and man-made inducted problems in the access to drinking water in Cameroon, which are underlaid by problems among and within actors. Furthermore, they constitute the controlling parameters of power within the different actors.

The answers to the second and third research question base on the Situation Analysis, which is summarized in the Figure 7–1.
Research Question 2  
What are the influencing conditions and formal and informal institutional structures of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon on international, national and local level?

Figure 7–1:  Conditions, Structures & Stakeholders in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon
Source: OTT 2014.

- International Level (formal and informal institutional structures):

The influence of the international level falls back on a long history that has already started during the period of colonization. The aftermath of the colonization influences both, the formal and informal institutional structures. The former includes e.g. the preferential treatment of francophone-dominated are-
as. The latter results in an imbalance of socio-cultural and economic values in Cameroon. Those have indirect influence on the drinking water sector.

With the upcoming of the international cooperation combined with the neoliberal approach (e.g. SAPs) of the 1980/90ties the formal institutional structures are still influenced. For instance the neoliberal approach of the Washington Census resulted in not context sensitive strategies for Cameroon including relocation of power to elites without enhancing development, technical capacities and accountability (e.g. SNEC privatization). The globally criticized neoliberal approach is gradually merged into the mainstream of PPP with focus on the French leasing model. The privatisation approach is included in all of the current Country Strategy Papers between the Cameroonian government and financial donors. It seems that the PPP approach is only a “new packing” of the former privatization idea. It appears that the international cooperation does not adopt its engagement in Cameroon in a holistic and contextual manner. Furthermore, international conventions like for instance the MDGs and IWRM principles influence the formal institutional structures within the Cameroonian drinking water sector as well.

- **National level (Conditions and formal and informal institutional structures):**

  The national ecological conditions regarding the amount of fresh water brings Cameroon on the forefront of African countries. With regard to the political dimension, Cameroon is governed by multi-party politics and promotes with the Vision 2035 and the GESP privatization as well as decentralization in the water sector. From the economical perspective, Cameroon is rich in natural resources and the geographical position as a transit zone offers an advantage in the Central African region. Formal institutional structures empowered the civil society by law (e.g. founding of associations; participation at conferences concerning the elaboration of a water policy and the access to drinking water).

  But in reality the conditions and institutional structures bring out another context for DWG. Cameroon is neither able to manage its extensive fresh water resources nor the financial investment budget in an efficient and sustainable way. The economic value of water is recognised but not clearly appointed. It
can be assumed that the data basis does not allow a reliable statement (e.g. how many people have access to drinking water). Solely, the president defines the national policy, which is the matrix for informal institutional structures like clientelism and corruption. The number of political parties is powerless compared to the ruling CPDM party. Furthermore, the in the GESP defined objective of decentralization process in general and concerning DWG is lacking behind the target. The allocation of institutional capacities and financial resources to the regional councils is weak (MINEE no longer sufficient resources to act as main contracting authority & councils are not jet operational). The multi-party system as well as the decentralization process is just a new packing of the corrupt governmental structures. It is rather unlikely that the PPP approach in the drinking water sector can efficiently improve the provision. The population growth and urbanization (social conditions) entitle an increased demand for drinking water but the infrastructural features are lacking behind. This is shaped by Cameroon’s general problem of corrupt and clientalistic structures. Moreover, although formal institutional structures are implemented, they are old, incomplete, disorganized, and insufficient.

- **Local Level – Upper Mefou Watershed (Conditions and formal and informal institutional structures)**

The ecological conditions would allow a sufficient access to drinking water. However, the amount of drinking water (13l/day/person) is below the guiding value after HR2W (50l/d/person). The humid sub-urban area reflects the nation-wide economical domination of the informal agriculture sector (household income: 88% have less than 1.50€/d). The formal economic income sector is predominated by men. Consequently, the economical value of drinking water would not be easily affordable. The social conditions are framed by population growth (urbanization and migration) accompanied with progressing deforestation and drinking water demand as well as socio-cultural diversity and poor infrastructural features (e.g. in case piped water connections are available, the provision is irregular and water quality is unsafe, roads, electricity). The main access resources to drinking water are public water pumps (64%). Additionally, the villagers in the Upper Mefou Watershed have access to education, but the level of education is low.
On local level the informal institutional structures dominate the management of drinking water. The informal institutions of chiefdoms are the most powerful structures, which experience nationwide institutional acceptance. Moreover, traditional family and dependence structures are distinct. On village level social meetings contribute to information exchange (relevance of water issues has increased due to the Mefou project). Other forms of information access are radio, TV and mobile phone. All relevant topics, which have an effect on the community, are discussed (e.g. maintenance to water resources). However, information exchange between the villages in the watershed is low. Through the example of the Mefou dam rehabilitation, clientilistic and corrupt structures are again reflected.

**Research Question 3**  
Who are the actors in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon and what are their range of actions, interests, capacities and interpenetrations?

- **International Level (Stakeholder actions, interests, capacities and interpenetrations):**

From the international level perspective mainly public donors are represented with a focus on the major urban areas. They collaborate with several ministries and partially with the public water company CamWater. The donors have an interest in drinking water privatization under the PPP approach. Beyond, the financial cooperation is based on good governance, growth and decentralization. The capacity is the high investment budget, but it does not seem that international donors can effectively cope with the corrupt and clientilistic structures to improve the access to drinking water nationwide and sustainable. The investment climate for international water companies as well as civil organizations is not pleasant in Cameroon. Hence, only one international private water company CDE (subsidiary company of ONEP) and one QuaNGO (GWP) are actively involved in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon.

- **National level (Stakeholder actions, interests, capacities and interpenetrations):**
Various stakeholders are involved in the DWG on the national level. They can be distinguished into public, private and civil stakeholders. Officially, MINEE is counting to the main public stakeholders concerning DWG. But in reality a huge number of further ministries are involved as well. CamWater constitutes the integrated public water company on behalf of MINEE and employs several technical executing companies (e.g. Razel, SetTunise, Pfeiffer). Civil stakeholders (e.g. NGOs) are allowed to participate in national conferences concerning drinking water, but their power to operate actively is limited to the local level (beside the international QuaNGO GWP – but not successful). Control organs like the NWC or the emergency unit of CDE exist in name only. Moreover, power disparities exist between different civil stakeholder groups and are formed differently in space.

All of them have the overall interest to improve the access to drinking water. However, their willingness of its implementation and their capacities vary. Besides, their high interpenetration, unclear definition of scope of action and slowness (due to corrupt and clientilistic structures) stand in the way of improvement. Furthermore, civil participation and power is weak and not accepted as essential stakeholder.

- **Local Level (Stakeholder actions, interests, capacities and interpenetrations)**

The several villages in the Upper Mefou Watershed bear the responsibility for the provision of drinking water while the support by private companies, governmental institutes or international organisations is weak. In case external stakeholders are active in the Upper Mefou Watershed the chief has to be the first instance of contact. Apart from the villages, only local NGOs and have got involved to improve the access to drinking water.

Power disparities exist at the local level and are related to sex, age and economical condition. Mainly children and women are obliged to carry water. Payment and access to drinking water depends on the owner (e.g. priest, public, private HH). Nevertheless, it could have been noticed that the sensitization to the relevance of drinking water and the maintenance of the water resources is stronger established than by the public and private water companies on national level.
With regard to the Mefou dam rehabilitation, the weak willingness and capacities of public stakeholders as CamWater are visible, which are again effected by corruption and clientilism as well as low accountability within the CamWater- TAU. Furthermore, financial dependency on MINEE and MINFI and administrative permissions of the Prime Minister aggravate efficiency as well as reducing capacities (e.g. delayed compensation).

7.1 Evaluation of Drinking Water Governance Components in Cameroon

The sup-chapters (7.1 & 7.2) summarize the result analysis (2.1 & 2.2) and are relate to the research question 4.

Research Question 4

Based on research question two and three, how far are the elaborated Drinking Water Governance components applied in Cameroon?

The elaborated components and indicators are based on UNDP (2013b) and the HR2W (WHO 2010) as well as the field assessment in Cameroon. The results are shown in Table 7-2 for which a benchmark is elaborated (Table 7-1). The benchmark ranges from one to four.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Non-existent</td>
<td>Existent, not active</td>
<td>Existent, active, not effective</td>
<td>Existent, active, effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-1: Benchmark of elaborated component associated indicators

Source: OTT 2014.

The conclusion of the situation analysis (1) is integrated in the results analysis. The components 1 to 5, 7 and 8 are considered on all three spatial scales. Solely, component 6 “HR2W” with its related indicators is considered on the local level of the Upper Mefou Watershed.

Finally, out of 32 indicators, only the indicator 6.4 regarding the distance to drinking water resources is evaluated with 4 (Existent, active, effective). In 26 cases either the indicator does not “exist” or “exists” but is “not active” in the DWG in Cameroon. In conclusion, stakeholders (1) willingness and capacities are present, but power of scope of action is limited. The same applies to the institution component (2). Cameroon can submit scattered laws and policies,
but does not include an active and efficient problem-solution-approach. Relevant elements for Good (Drinking) Water Governance (3, 4 & 5) do either not exist or have no active or efficient influence on the drinking water sector in Cameroon. With regard to the indicators for access to drinking water after the HR2W (6) on local level, the benchmark reflects a more positive situation in the drinking water sector. Nevertheless, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Drinking Water Governance are mainly evaluated with the benchmark of 1 or 2.
### Table 7-2: Assessment of Drinking Water Governance Components and Indicators

**Key:** 1) Non-existent; 2) Existent, not active; 3) Existent, active, not effective; 4) Existent, active, effective. Source: OTT 2014 AFTER: RAUCH 2009; WHO 2010; UNDP 2013b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Stakeholder</td>
<td>1.1 Willingness to change</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Capacity to change</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Institutions</td>
<td>2.1 Water policies (formulated, established, implemented)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Water laws and rules</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Solutions towards human right to water</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 IWRM</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Transparency</td>
<td>3.1 Availability of reliable information</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Accessibility to reliable information</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Accountability</td>
<td>4.1 Clarification of stakeholder roles &amp; responsibilities</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Maintenance &amp; warning system</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Social accountability (action taken by the people, media and civil society to hold the state and decision makers to account)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Participation</td>
<td>5.1 Civil Society participation in law and practise</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Legal basis for affected stakeholder to participate</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 Decentralized &amp; joint decision making</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 Equal possibilities (Gender)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Human Right to Water</td>
<td>6.1 Quantity (sufficient)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2 Quality (safe)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3 Acceptable (culture, gender, lifecycles, privacy)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4 Accessible (1.5km in rural; 0.2km in urban areas)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5 Affordable (socio-economic value)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.6 Equitable (gender, class, sex etc.)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Efficiency</td>
<td>7.1 Effective maintenance of infrastructure</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 Water distribution vs. losses (non-revenue water)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3 Significant increased service coverage since PPP according to the objective</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4 Billing and collecting</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Effectiveness</td>
<td>7.1 No corruption</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 Practice according to the law</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3 Objective of national water policy is achieved</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4 High stakeholder capacity (service, allocation, distribution)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.5 Appropriate legislation for water allocation, quality, sustainable resource protection</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.6 Secured drinking water access in urban areas</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7 Secured drinking water access in rural areas</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8 Functioning coordination with other water sectors</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The benchmark needs to be critically reflected with regard to the four following facts:

- Depending on the point of view, the indicators for transparency (3.1 & 3.2) could also be evaluated with “2” since data exist from the National Statistic Institute and the media published information. However, they are rarely reliable.

- The indicators of the Human Right to Water (6) only consider the local study area, not the nation-wide situation.

- Indicator 7.2 concerning “water distribution vs. losses” could be evaluated with “4” as well, depending on the point of view. The intended statement is that the water losses are enormously high.

- The indicator “billing and collecting” (7.4) is based on the assessment in the watershed, observations and information about CDE, but the level of information does not allow a comprehensive valuation.

### 7.2 The SWOTs of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon

**Research Question 4:** Consequently, what are the SWOTs of the Drinking Water Governance?

The SWOT analysis represents the last pillar (2.2) of the analytical framework. The information of the situation analysis as well as the elaboration of DWG components present the information base for the SWOT analysis in the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon. In general, the SWOT analysis illustrates that the Cameroonian have to struggle with a number of weaknesses and threats in the Drinking Water Governance. Nevertheless, strengths have been elaborated as well, which pave the way for opportunities and improvements in the management of drinking water in Cameroon. The SWOT Analysis is shown in Table 7-3.
**Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Opportunities** | **Threats**
---|---|---|---
**International**
- High investment budget in the drinking water sector in Cameroon (provision of information about the budget volume)
- Several donors in the DWG
- Support to elaborate a national water policy (e.g. IWRM)
- Emphasis on the economical value of drinking water by neglecting the aspects of HR2W (since the neoliberal approach)
- Focus on five urban areas, negligence of rural area
- Exclusive focus on privatization (without sustainable and holistic perspective)
- Experience (of water management, supply, protection and collaboration at least since the 1970s)
- More holistic & sustainable strategy in the DWG (with Post 2015 & coming CSPs)
- Cooperation with MINATD concerning decentralization
- Dublin and IWRM principle n°3 is not integrated in the MDG up to now
- Cherry picking of TWC of most profitable areas (leads to special disparity of investment and development of drinking water access)
**National**
- Amount of Fresh Water: Three times more fresh water resources as compared to the world average
- Economical, social, political and ecological potential
- Law No. 98/005 (water is a national heritage which the state has to protect to ensure all citizens the access to water)
- Stakeholder have the interest to improve the access to drinking water and are aware of the priority of clearly characterized remit and scope of action)
- Vision 2035, PRSP & GESP compromise drinking water access targets & decentralization process
- Action plan for water supply in urban & rural areas (PAEPAR & LPHSU)
- Awareness of bad governance structures
- Civic associations are permitted by law
- Young population has come along with the willingness and motivation to improve DWG structures
- Economical, social, political and ecological conditions are not used sustainably & in everyone’s interest
- Inability of drinking water management
- Missing infrastructure & creeping extension
- Inability of financial project management (e.g. MINEE is unable to use up to 50% of the budget; discrepancies between budget and project cycle; poor funding of monitoring system & maintenance; Investment gap between rural, urban and within urban areas)
- Stakeholder remit and scope of action not clarified within and among stakeholders (MINEE not on track of its target must be used in an efficient way)
- An age-related change referring to the head of the government may bring change in the constitutions with a trickle down effect
- High investment budget from international cooperation partners has to be used in an efficient way
- An IWRM Plan as national water policy is in process (FANGIRE)
- Reinforcement of maintenance by financial allocation and elimination of administrative barriers
- Extension of infrastructure while taking into account the capacities of CamWater and CDUs and their interdependence and remit
- Adaptation of the terms of reference between CDE and CamWater to the nation-wide conditions
- Renewal of legal framework
- Empowerment of stakeholders on sub-national level
- Change in education concerns to assume accountability
- Incentives (improved conditions) to increase the capacities and willingness of stakeholders (e.g. accountability, increased scope of action)
- Alternatism of the SAPs
- Bad governance structures & corruption and clientelism across the border inhibit good drinking water management
- Poor investment climate for (inter)national stakeholders,
- High dependency on international donation (generated by the government)
- Government tolerates ‘resource grabbing’ by focusing on resource exploration instead of protection
- The theory of institutional structures and conditions does not correspond with Cameroon’s reality
- Urbanization & population growth brings along increased demand of drinking water
- Inconsistent understanding of drinking water management (e.g. interpretation of GESP varies by sector) and missing clarification of scope of actions within and among actors lowers accountability
- The efficiency of the PPP approach could not be proven
- In rural areas neither private nor public water stakeholders are operating
- No ambitions to attribute a central role in the management of drinking water to children and women
- Suppression of civil society (by age, sex, economic power) and individual interests dominate life of society
- Legal instruments exist to restrict civic associations and participation in intrinsic parts of the governance is not fulfilled
- The influence of international values results in an unbalanced value ratio in Cameroon with indirect influence on drinking water management

**Local**
- Water availability (accessible) and a dense drainage network
- Increased number of water pumps in the last three years
- Social accountability for maintenance in the UMW
- Informal institutional structures undertake the function of the missing formal institutional structures (e.g. chiefdom, Tantin)
- Mefou Dam rehabilitation (Environmental and Social Assessment; Institutional investment in the UMW; Drinking water provision Yaoundé)
- Drinking water resources neither sufficient nor safe
- Economical value of water is not easily affordable
- Drinking water access conditions are not equitable (age, gender, economical power; spatial diversity)
- Mefou Dam rehabilitation (assessment is lacking behind the time frame; incomplete and uncertain compensation agreement)
- Urbanization process combined with infrastructural investment
- Mefou dam rehabilitation (increased drinking water provision for Yaoundé and maybe for some HH in the UMW; time-limited job opportunities for individuals of the UMW)
- Contamination & bad quality of drinking water
- Urbanization & migration in direction of the UMW (increased drinking water demand)
- Maintenance is not easily affordable (due to economic conditions, engagement of public or private companies, partly willingness)
- General bad infrastructure facilities (e.g. water, roads, electricity)
- Power and social differences are reproduced in the access to water
- Poverty: 88 % have less than 1,5 €/ day
- Floods
- Mefou rehabilitation (resettlement; villagers do not have certificate of titles; unclear characterization of protection areas; poor environmental and social data)

**Table 7-3: SWOT Analysis of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon.**

Source: OUY 2014.
7.3 Outlook

A DWG assessment is the first step to trigger changes that are needed to improve the water sector performance. As a consequence, to improve the access to drinking water and its management, the whole Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon is in need to be changed. The youth of Cameroon is seen as the key for sustainable, efficient and effective improvement in the access to drinking water. However, further recommendations would become as complex as the analysis of the Drinking Water Governance in Cameroon.

In the frame of the present thesis, several issues concerning the Drinking Water Governance had be left out. Deductive, an outlook of topics is presented which would be interesting to become examined more precisely:

• Precise analysis of the financial donation chain in the DWG
• Interrelation between CamWater and CDE concerning (i) infrastructure, which CamWater is providing and CDE is using; (ii) the gains and cost of both of them
• The level of engagement of stakeholders in the primarily focused five urban areas
• The influence of stakeholders and institutional structures in semi-arid areas of the country
• Realization of targets (e.g. from the GESP; urban & rural strategy)
• Precise examination of civil organizations in Cameroon
• Reasons, why the water giant Suez did not become the private partner in the PPP relation
• Opportunities of the youth in the Drinking Water Governance
A Attachment

List of Attachments

A. 1 Figures  XCIX
A. 2 Tables  CIV
A. 3 Data DVD  XCVIII
A.1 Figures

Figure A–1: Cameroonian IWM Project Team
Source: OTT 2013.
Figure A–2: The Six Main Watersheds in Cameroon
Source: Ott 2014.
Figure A–3: Deforestation in the Upper Mefou Watershed  
Source: Ott 2013.

Figure A–4: Cloth Washing in a Tributary of the Mefou Dam  
Source: Ott 2013.
Figure A–5: Fieldwork with CamWater TAU in the Upper Mefou Watershed
Source: OTT 2013.

Figure A–6: GPS Detection of the Upper Mefou Watershed by Moto
Source: OTT 2013.
Figure A–7: Reconstruction of the Pipe System from Nkolbisson till the Water Treatment Station Messa by the private German Company Pfeiffer

Source: Ott 2013.
### A.2 Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Kind of Interview</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dynamic Cityoenna</td>
<td>23.03.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>YVE</td>
<td>25.03.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SetTunise</td>
<td>16.04.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>French, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MINEE (Electricity)</td>
<td>07.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>16.05.2013</td>
<td>Committed Questionnaire</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>16.05.2013</td>
<td>Committed Questionnaire</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>21.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>21.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CamWater</td>
<td>21.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CamWater - TAU: Coordinator Mefou Dam</td>
<td>22.05.2013, 28.05.2013, 04.06.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pfeiffer (Manager of Project)</td>
<td>28.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>German, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>GWP – Cam (President)</td>
<td>28.05.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>French, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>CDE – TAU Mefou (Chef of service, production and management of water)</td>
<td>03.06.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>French, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MINEE (Direction Water Supply &amp; Hydrology. Head of service)</td>
<td>03.06.2013, 05.06.2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>French, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>University Yaoundé (Department of Geography)</td>
<td>March – June 2013, August 2013</td>
<td>Semi-structured interview, Discussions, Fieldwork</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A-1:** List of Expert Interview Partners

Source: OTT 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Service Contracts | • Public authorities remain responsible for: operation and maintenance.  
  • Outsourcing of specific services like billing |
| Management Contracts | • Public authorities remain responsible for: monitoring new investments, contractor operation and maintenance |
| Lease Contracts | • Public authorities transfer of responsibility for operation and maintenance to the leaser  
  • - Leaser: rent facilities |
| Boo/Boot/Bott | • Boo: Build, Own, Operate; Boot: Build, Own, Operate, Transfer; Bott: Build, Own, Train, Transfer  
  • Contractor: builds, owns and/or operates a new water system, like water treatment  
  • Transfers of facilities after a predetermined time to public authorities  
  • Utility is obliged to pay for a specified quantity of water whether or not that quantity is consumed |
| Concession Contracts | • Public authorities: transfer complete water system service to the concessionaire for the concession period (including: operation, maintenance, management, capital investments, tariff collection and customer service |
| Divestiture | • Private operator: has full ownership of the water utility |

**Table A-2: Contract Forms of PPP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1952     | Creation of the first **Ministry of Agricultural & Engineering.**  
  • Objective was fresh water supply of rural population in North Cameroon. |
| 1957     | Decree 57/509 (Article 11):  
  • The state is the decisive factor in the water sector |
| 1962     | Creation of the **Office of Water within the Ministry of Transport, Mines and Telecommunications:**  
  • Responsible for groundwater exploration & conducting inventories of water points. |
| 1967/68  | Creation of **SNEC:**  
  • State granted the operation of public water supply networks in towns for 40 years. |
| 1977     | Creation of the **Ministry of Mines & Energy:**  
  • Responsible for WSS in urban centres  
  • Responsibility for rural areas remained under MINADER. |
| 1984     | Law (No. 084/013):  
  • First law pertaining to water regimes (without implementation)  
  **Creation of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water:**  
  • Water became reorganized as section in the ministry  
  • Responsible for WSS for the whole country through the Directorate of Rural Water Supply (DHR=Direction de l'Hydraulique Rurale) and the Directorate of Urban Water and Sanitation (DEAU: Direction de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement Urbain). |
| 1988     | Privatization process:  
  • Six laws and regulations concerning privatization became drafted |
| 1992     | Law (No. 92/002):  
  • Pertaining the creation of local authorities (without immediate impact on the water sector).  
  • Merger of DHR and DEAU into the **Directorate of Water**  
  • (DE: Direction de l'Eau) in charge of WSS in rural and urban areas.  
  **Constitution (18.01.1996): Everyone has the right to a healthy environment and the state secures a safe environment.**  
  • Since water is a part of the environment one could say the right to safe drinking water is grounded in the constitution.  
  **Law (No. 96/12) (05.08.1996): Environmental Management**  
  • Prior to this: legal texts were only concerned with the protection of resources. |
| 1998     | **Law (No. 98/005):**  
  • Water is a national heritage; the state has to secure the protection of water while facilitating alternative water supply to all in case of missing public water supply.  
  **Creation of the National Water Committee (NWC)**  
  • Coordination of activities in the water sector  
  • Not operational yet |
| 1999     | **SNEC privatization process started**  
  • Provisional acquisition of SNEC by the French company Suez |
| 2000     | **Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)**  
  **Vision of Water Management for the 21st Century:**  
  • The vision is elaborated by ECCAS  
  • Shall be deemed to be the base for the **PANGIRE**  
  **Vision Eau Cameroun 2025:**  
  • The vision is elaborated by the government |
| 2001     | Decree 2001/216:  
  • Creation of a **bank account** for WSS development projects  
  • Not operational |
Decree 2001/161/PM:
- Lays down the role, organisation and function of the National Water Committee
- Still not operational

Decree 2001/162/PM:
- Pertaining the modalities for creation of water agents for water control

Decree 2001/163/PM:
- Pertaining the regulation of protection zones, drinking water treatment and storing
- Pertaining the requirements for industrial water withdrawal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Nomination of a temporary administrator to oversee the privatization process and ensure continuity of the public water service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Acquisition of SNEC by Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux has failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Acquisition of SNEC by Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux has failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Creation of GWP-Cmr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>WSS Program for urban and rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Conclusion of the SNEC privatization process: Establishment of a leasing contract for the management and operation of urban facilities between the state, CamWater &amp; CDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>CamWater undertakes the financial and functional management in urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Validation of the PANGIRE assessment done by GWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Adaptation of the budget to the project cycle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A-3: Key Dates in the Reformation of the Drinking Water Sector

A.3 Data CD

The third attachment contains a data CD and is attached at the last page of the research work. The CD includes the following data:

1. A folder including pictures of the fieldwork in the Upper Mefou Watershed
2. The semi-structured questionnaire for the household interviews in the Upper Mefou Watershed
3. The transcribed expert interviews
4. The transcribed household interviews
5. The SPSS databank of the household interviews
List of Literature


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WDM (2005): "Dirty aid, dirty water. The UK Government’s push to privatise water and sanitation in poor countries." 73.


Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung

Ich erkläre hiermit an Eides statt,

dass ich die vorliegende Studienarbeit selbstständig angefertigt,

keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen benutzt,

die wörtlich oder dem Inhalt nach aus fremden Arbeiten entnommenen Stellen, bildlichen Darstellungen und dergleichen als solche genau kenntlich gemacht und keine unerlaubte fremde Hilfe in Anspruch genommen habe.
